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icial District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0 
User: VVALDEMER 
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks 
)ate 
5/14/2012 
;/15/2012 
/16/2012 
/24/2012 
/1/2012 
New Case Filed-Felony 
Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
Criminal Complaint 
Felony 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 05/14/2012 01 :32 PM) 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 
01 :32 PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 
01 :32 PM: Arraignment I First Appearance 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 
01 :32 PM: Constitutional Rights Warning 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 
01 :32 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 
01:32 PM: Consolidation Of Files w/CR2012-12215*C 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 
01 :32 PM: Commitment On Bond/$25,000.00 
Change Assigned Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 05/24/2012 08:30 AM) 
Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 25000.00 ) 
Notice of Bond Posted 
PA's Response For Request For Discovery 
Request For Discovery 
Judge 
Daya 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Daya 0 Onanubosi 
Daya 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Daya 0 Onanubosi 
Daya 0 Onanubosi 
Daya 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Dayo 0 Onanubosi 
Gregor; F. Frates 
Gregory F. Frates 
Gregory F. Frates 
Gregory F. Frates 
Gregory F. Frates 
Gregory F. Frates 
Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi 
Waiver Of Extradition 
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled 
Hearing Held 
Gregory F. Frates 
Gregory F. Frates 
on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Charles Hay 
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Charles Hay 
Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound Over) 
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Charles Hay 
Order Binding Defendant Over to District Court 
Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 06/01/2012 09:00 AM) Molly J Huskey 
Information 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Thomas J Ryan 
Gregory M Culet 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Gregory M Culet 
Hearing Held RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1 :30-RYAN-JT-SEPT 
25-27@9:00-MORFITT 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Gregory M Culet 
Arraignment I First Appearance RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1 :30-RYAN-JT-SEPT 
25-27@9:00-MORFITT 
Date: 6/27/2013 
Time: 09:20 AM 
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icia! District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0 
User: WALDEMER 
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks 
Jate 
3/1/2012 
3/5/2012 
3/29/2012 
7/23/2012 
;1212012 
;/9/2012 
i/14/2012 
i/15/2012 
;/16/2012 
/24/2012 
/29/2012 
/30/2012 
/31/2012 
/4/2012 
110/2012 
Felony 
Judge 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Gregory M Culet 
Appear & Plead Not Guilty RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1:30-RYAN-JT-SEPT 
25-27@9:00-MORFITT 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 08/27/2012 01 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/25/2012 09:00 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Request For Discovery 
Motion to Suppress 
Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion To Suppress 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/23/2012 02:00 PM) Motion to 
Suppress 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00 PM: 
Continued Motion to Suppress 
Thomas J Ryan 
James C. Morfitt 
Court Clerks District (998) 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00 PM: Thomas J Ryan 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/16/2012 01:30 PM) to suppress Thomas J Ryan 
Pa's First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Pa's Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Objection To Motion To Suppress Evidence 
papers/Notice and Demand For Abatement 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 08/27/2012 01 :30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/16/2012 01 :30 PM: 
Hearing Held to suppress - 14 days for additional briefing 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/16/2012 01 :30 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 09/18/2012 01 :30 PM) 
Pa's Third Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Defendant's Supplemental Brief In Support Of Motion To Suppress 
Motion To Appear Tele phonically At Pre-Trial Conference 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Order allowing def to appear telephonically at PT conference Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 01 :30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 09/18/2012 03:00 PM) Def to appear 
Telephonically 
Objection to motion to suppress evidence 
Order to Provide Auto Recording without Cost 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Jate: 6/27 /2013 
fime: 09:20 AM 
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icial District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0 
User: WALDEMER 
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks 
)ate 
j/17/2012 
3/18/2012 
l/19/2012 
l/21/2012 
l/24/2012 
l/25/2012 
/27/2012 
0/10/2012 
Felony 
Judge 
Response to State's Objection to Motion to Suppress Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held Def to appear Telephonically 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 03:00 PM: District Thomas J Ryan 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Memorandum decision upon motion to suppress Thomas J Ryan 
Pa's Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery Thomas J Ryan 
Motion To Shorten Time For Hearing And Notice Of Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Motion To Continue JT And Notice Of Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/24/2012 09:00 AM) motion to James C. Morfitt 
shorten time, motion to continue 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 AM: James C. Morfitt 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Carole Bull 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages motion to shorten time, motion to continue 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 AM: James C. Morfitt 
Hearing Held motion to shorten time, motion to continue 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 AM: James C. Morfitt 
Continued motion to shorten time, motion to continue 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/25/2012 09:00 AM: District James C. Morfitt 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Debora Kreidler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages State's Mo to Shorten Time I to Continue 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/25/2012 09:00 AM: Failure James C. Morfitt 
To Appear For Hearing Or Trial State's Mo to Shorten Time I to Continue 
Notice of Bond Forfeiture James C. Morfitt 
Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount: 50000.00 Failure to Appear-total Thomas J Ryan 
bond with CR-2012-12215*C Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0 
Case Status Changed: Inactive 
Motion to reconside order denying motion to suppress 
Motion for permission to appeal 
Case Status Changed: Reopened 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/10/2012 10:30 AM) Motn for 
Permission to Appeal/ Motn to Reconsider 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/10/2012 10:30 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/10/2012 10:30 AM: 
Hearing Held Motn for Permission to Appeal/ Motn to Reconsider 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
'.Jate: 6/27/2013 
Time: 09:20 AM 
::iage 4 of 6 
icial District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0 
User: WALDEMER 
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks 
)ate 
0/10/2012 
I 0/16/2012 
:1/19/2012 
U11/2013 
'./21/2013 
/1/2013 
/4/2013 
/12/2013 
/13/2013 
/15/2013 
Felony 
Motion Held - Motn to Reconsider 
motion to reconsider taken under advisement-court to issue written ruling 
Objection to Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to 
Supress & Leave for Motion to Appeal 
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider 
Order Denying Motion For Permission to Appeal 
Warrant Returned Failure to Appear-total bond with CR-2012-12215*C 
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew Of served in Hillsboro Oregon 
Inactive 
Case Status Changed: Inactive 
status changed to Active 
Case Status Changed: Pending 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 02/21/2013 01 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 02/21/2013 01 :30 PM) 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013 
01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013 
01 :30 PM: Arraignment I First Appearance 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013 
01 :30 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender 
Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 03/01/2013 09:00 AM) 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
James A (J.R.) Schiller 
James A (J.R.) Schiller 
James A (J.R.) Schiller 
James A (J.R.) Schiller 
James A (J.R.) Schiller 
Molly J Huskey 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 03/01/2013 09:07 AM: Dennis E. Goff 
Hearing Held RYAN-FT A-JURY TRIAL 
JT-MARCH 508@8:30-MORFITT 
JT-APRIL 23-26@8:30-MORFITT 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/23/2013 08:30 AM) 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Notice Of Hearing 
PD-Request For Discovery 
Motion To Set Aside Forfeiture And Exonerate Bond And Conditional 
Request For Hearing (w/order) 
Notice Of Hearing For Change Of Plea 
Hearing Scheduled (Change of Plea 03/15/2013 12:30 AM) 
James C. Morfitt 
Dennis E. Goff 
Dennis E. Goff 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 04/23/2013 08:30 AM: Hearing James C. Morfitt 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM: Renae J. Hoff 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Jess than 100 pages 
SENT- May 6@2:15PM 
PCS {F} 
Jate: 6/27/2013 
Time: 09:20 AM 
=>age 5 of 6 
icial District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0 
User: WALDEMER 
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks 
Jate 
3/15/2013 
)/6/2013 
)/7/2013 
/8/2013 
Felony 
Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM: 
Hearing Held RYAN-
SENT- May 6@2:15PM 
PCS {F} 
Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM: 
Guilty Plea Advisory Form RYAN-
SENT- May 6@2:15PM 
PCS {F} 
Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM: 
Change Plea To Guilty Before Hit RYAN-
SENT- May 6@2:15PM 
PCS {F} 
Judge 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM: Renae J. Hoff 
Order for Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and Substance Abuse 
Assessment RYAN-
SENT- May 6@2:15PM 
PCS {F} 
Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM: Renae J. Hoff 
Order to Report to District Ill Probation and Parole 
Hearing result for Change of Plea scheduled on 03/15/2013 01 :30 PM: Renae J. Hoff 
Order Release to Pre-trial Release Program-to be released at 8:00 a.m. on 
3/18/13 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/06/2013 02: 15 PM) PSI/SA 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/06/2013 02:15 PM: 
Continued PSI/SA 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/06/2013 02:15 PM: District Thomas J Ryan 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 05/07 /2013 01 :30 PM) PSI & SA 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07/2013 01 :30 PM: 
Hearing Held PSI & SA 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07 /2013 01 :30 PM: 
Withheld Judgment Entered PSI & SA 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07/2013 01 :30 PM: 
Sentenced To Fine And Incarceration PSI & SA 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07/2013 01:30 PM: 
Probation Ordered PSI & SA 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 05/07/2013 01 :30 PM: Notice Thomas J Ryan 
to defendant upon sentencing 
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Restitution Order Filed 
Restitution Ordered 100.00 victim# 1 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Date: 6/27/2013 
Time: 09:20 AM 
Page 6 of 6 
Thir icial District Court - Canyon County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-2012-0012437-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0 
State of Idaho vs. Matthew 0 Brooks 
Jate 
5/9/2013 
5/14/2013 
)/24/2013 
3/3/2013 
Felony 
Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 25,000.00) 
Order of probation on withheld judgment 
Motion For Appointment Of State Appellate Public Defender 
Notice of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender 
User: \/VALDEMER 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
IN THE COURT OF THE 3rd JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) ISP DR#:B12001578 
vs. ) 
) 
Citation#: ISP0136310 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
BROOKS, Matthew 0 
Defendant. 
DOB
SSN:
OLN
STATE: Idaho 
State ofldaho, ) 
) SS. 
County of Canyon ) 
) t!R ~JCJ737 
I, Trooper Blake 9igley, the undersigned, being duly sworn of oath, deposes and says that: 
1. I am a peace officer employed by the Idaho State Police. 
2. The defendant was arrested on May 12, 2012 at 1350 hours DAM I ~PM for the 
crime( s) of: 
I. Felony Possession ofMethamphetamine- 37-2732C(3)(1) 
II. Possession of Drug Paraphemalia-37-2734A 
3. Location of Occurrence: Eastbound Interstate 84@approximatelymilepost 27.5, 
Canyon County, Idaho 
4. Identified the defendant as: DIAZ, Roberto by: 
0Driver's License ~Verbal by Defendant 
0Military ID Ostate ID Card 
Ocredit Cards 0Paperwork Found 
0Witness __ identified defendant. 
0Student ID Card 
Oother: __ 
5. The crime( s) was committed in my presence. ~yes I ON o 
If no, information was supplied to me by: (witness) __ . 
6. I believe there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed such crime(s) 
because of the following facts: 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
NOTE: You must include the source of all information that you provided below. Include 
both what you observed and what you learned from someone else (include name of that 
person). 
PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE STOP AND ARREST: 
On May 12, 2012 hours, at approximately 1632 hours, I, Trooper Blake Higley, stopped a 
blue Ford ThlU1derbird (Washington registration 706XJZ) on eastbound Interstate 84 at 
approximately milepost 27.5 in Canyon, County Idaho. I first observed this vehicle as it passed my 
location traveling 60 mph in a posted 75mph speed zone. As I approached the location of the 
vehicle, I observed it again traveling well below the posted speed limit of 65mph. I observed the 
vehicle traveling in the left lane, the vehicle signaled briefly, for less than two seconds and changed 
into the right lane. The lane cha,.71ge was abrupt and sudden. I approached the vehicle and spoke 
with the driver, later identified verbally as Matthew 0 BROOKS (DO  I immediately 
saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat with two cig  it. Also 
contained within cigarette box was a small plastic bag which contained a crystal substance which I 
believed to be metharnphetamine. I could also smell the odor of marijuana in the vehicle, and could 
plainly see a small metal cone, which I knew to be the top portion of a marijuana pipe sitting in the 
center console. I asked BROOKS about meth use, which he denied. BROOKS later admitted to 
using methamphetamine two months ago. I reached in the vehicle and retrieved the cigarette box 
containing what I believed to be methamphetamine. BROOKS attempted to stop me from 
retrieving the box. I placed the cigarette box on the roof of the vehicle, and told BROOKS to exit 
the vehicle. I placed BROOKS in handcuffs and instructed him he was being d.etained. BROOKS 
was non-compliant and it took several minutes to get his name. \\'bile searching the interior of the 
vehicle, a marijuana pipe was found behind the driver's seat. I also located a blue zipper pouch in 
the top zipper compartment of the suitcase. Within the pouch, I located two injection needles, a 
spoon, rubber band, and baggies. I tested the crystal substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit 
(NIK). The test resulted in a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. The total grai.u weight 
was .4grams. 
Dated: 05113/2012 
Subscribed and sworn before me on this~ day of Af A=i 2012.. . 
_________ (or) 9<,.LU1' LCkCD0/ 
Person Authorized to Administer Oath Notary Public ofldaho 
Title: SR'. '12_ Q__Q Residing at:'l<_~<i; Toi.a.ho S\-cd:1 ~U fV\t-n'lCcV', 
My Comrnission Expires: 'S/;;> ~ );;..o \ R 
sz 
BRYAN F. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S HILL, DEPUTY 
Caldwell, Idaho 83 605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAT S 
D.O.B
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
SS 
County of Canyon ) 
CASE NO.CR201 
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 
POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 
Felony, I.C.37-2732(c)(l) 
(_ 
PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this ) cf day of May, 2012, 
, ---1 ~!'A~ j ~of the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, who ~~ 
being duly sworn, complains and says: 
1 IG N COMPLAINT 
the County of Canyon, State ofidaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit: 
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 37-2732(c)(l) and against the 
power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Complainant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 'r day of May, 2012. 
2 
COMPLAINT 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
[;J ARRAIGNMENT [;J IN-CUSTODY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
-vs-
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
D True Name 
Corrected Name: 
APPEARANCES: 
t8J Defendant 
D Defendant's Attorney D 
ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS: Defendant 
Plaintiff 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR2012-12437*C/CR2012-12215*C 
Date: MAY 14, 2012 
Judge: ONANUBOSI 
Recording: MAG? (316 - 319) 
[8J Prosecutor Mr. Matt Thompson 
D Interpreter 
[;J was informed of the charges against him/her and all legal rights, including the right to be represented by 
counsel. 
[;J requested court appointed counsel. 
[;J lndigency hearing held. 
[;J Court appointed public defender. 
D Arraignment continued to 
D to consult I retain counsel, D other 
D waived right to counsel. 
D Court denied court-appointed counsel. 
before Judge 
[8JPRELIMINARY HEARING: 
[8J Preliminary Hearing set 
D District Court Arraignment: 
Statutory time waived: DYes [8JNo 
May 24, 2012 at 8:30 a.m. 
D Preliminary Hearing Waived 
before Judge Frates 
BAIL: State recommends 
D Released on written citation promise to appear 
D Released on own recognizance (O.R.) 
D Released to pre-trial release officer. 
D No Contact Order D entered D continued 
D Address Verified 
OTHER: 
ARRAIGNMENT I FIRST APPEARANCE 
before Judge 
D Released on bond previously posted. 
[8J Remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 
[;J Bail set at $25,000.00/total 
i:g) Consolidated with CR2012-12215*C 
D Corrected Address __ 
07/2009 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO/or 
f\~lf~~~ () .~oQ\(J~ 
FILED -~~-W-_:_+.1..£:::::::::: r.uc -'~-l.--4-•·~·~· 
CLERK 
BY~_..,,...:-.++->-~~=-==-"="=-:....;:;-~-
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of the above-named applicant and it appearing to 
be a proper case, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Public Defender be, and hereby is, appointed for 
Dated: ()S \id\\ 2 I , 
A~kln Custody-- Bond$ ~5, D00°0 L\-DH 
0 Released: 0 O.R. 1 I · 
0 on bond previously posted 
0 to PreTrial Release 
Juvenile: 0 In Custody 
0 Released to 
Judge 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
0 No Contact Order entered. 
0 Cases consolidated. 
[Js(, Discovery provided by State. 
0 Interpreter required. 
0 Additional charge of FT A. 
Original--Court File 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
Yellow--Public Defender Pink--Prosecuting Attorney 
2/06 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
ST ATE OE IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
FILED 0sh4h~ ATbl1 
CLERKL&1 lt)-iE. DISTR[CT COURT 
p.M. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
-vs-
Defendant, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~) 
BY ~)1Attv-.4)7 
u u 
0 Conditional Release/Pretrial Services 
0 Release on Own Recognizance 
(71 Commitment on Bond i.I'-._ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant abide by the following conditions of release: 
0 Defendant is Ordered released 
0 On own recognizance 0 Placed on probation 0 Case Dismissed 
i;iJ. Bond having been set in the sum of $~5( ~~#Total Bond 
, DEPUTY 
0 Bond having been 0 increased 0 reduced to the sum of$ 0 Total Bond 
0 Upon posting bond, defendant must report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services office as stated below: 
! 
0 Defendant shall report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services Office and follow the standard reporting conditions: 
0 Comply with a curfew designated by the Court or standard curfew set by Pretrial Services ______ _ 
0 Not consume or possess alcoholic beverages or mood altering substances without a valid prescription. 
0 Submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol and/or drugs as requested by Pretrial Services at defendant's expense. 
0 Not operate or be in the driver's position of any motor vehicle. 
0 Abide by any No Contact Order and its conditions. 
0 Submit to 0 GPS 0 Alcohol monitoring as directed by Pretrial Services. 
Defendants Ordered to submit to GPS or alcohol monitoring shall make arrangements with a provider 
approved by Pretrial Services, prior to release. 
Failure by defendant to comply with the rules and/or reporting conditions and/or requirements of release as 
Ordered by the Court may result in the revocation of release and return to the custody of the Sheriff. 
¥White - Court reJ Yellow- Jail/Pretrial Services 
/) 
¢Pink - Defendant 10/11 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
STATE OF IDAHO 
-vs-
Matthew 0. Brooks 
0 True Name 
Corrected Name: 
APPEARANCES: 
[gJ Defendant 
[gJ Prosecutor - Will Fletcher 
Plaintiff 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR12-12437C, CR12-12215C 
Date: May 24, 2012 
Judge: Hay 
Recording: Mag 6 {854-854) 
[gJ Defendant's Attorney - Scott James 
0 Interpreter 
FAILURE TO APPEAR: Defendant failed to appear. It is Ordered 
0 bench warrant issued--bail $ 0 bond forfeited. 
OOther __ . 
PROCEEDINGS: 
[gJ Preliminary hearing waived; Defendant bound over to District Court. 
O Preliminary hearing held. 
0 Preliminary hearing continued to __ at __ .m. before Judge __ . 
O State moved to dismiss on the grounds: __ . 
O Court dismissed Complaint. 
O Prospective witnesses excluded. 
[gJ State's recommendations: Offer not stated but was noted it would remain open until Pre-Trial 
Conference. 
STATE'S WITNESSES SWORN: 1. 2. 
3. 4. 5. 
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES SWORN: 1. 
3. 4. 
0 Defendant had no testimony or evidence to present. 
EXHIBITS: 0 As set forth on attached list. 
COURT'S RULING: 
0 No probable cause; Complaint dismissed; Defendant discharged. 
2. 
5. 
0 Bond exonerated. 0 Probable cause found for offense set forth in Complaint. 
0 Charges amended to: __ . 
0 Probable cause found for amended charge. 
[gJ Defendant held to answer to the District Court. District Court Arraignment set for 6/1/12 at 9:00 a.m. 
before Judge Huskey. 
(gJ Misdemeanor case(s) continued consolidated with felony case for further proceedings. 
D Motion for bond reduction continued until the time of District Court Arraignment. 
BAIL: The Defendant was 
-0 Released on own recognizance (O.R.). 
n Remanded to custody of the sheriff. 
D Bail set$ __ . 
0 Released to pre-trial release officer. 
IXl Released on bond previously posted. 
OTHER: Mr. James advised the Court of the defendant's intent to hire private counsei. 
_k_._B~e~. c~::--_fL-_l_-~_y+--·---· Deputy Clerk 
I 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 07/2009 
Judicial District 0 State of Idaho 
In and For the Co 1• ..J f Canyon 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Filed: 
<,>/' 
Clerk of the District Court 
, Deputy 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER BINDING DEFENDANT OVER TO 
DISTRICT COURT 
1 Defendant, 
Preliminary hearing having been ~ved D held in this case on the 2~~ day of 
VY\ CJ:tr , 20 \ '?- and the Court being fully satisfied that a public offense has been 
committed a:that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe the Defendant guilty thereof, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant herein be held to answer in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of The State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, to the charge of~ OSSeSS~\ 0-Y\ of 
a felony, committed in Canyon County, Idaho on or about the \ ?~ day of l/Y\f<(J 
20 \ 1--- . 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant herein shall be arraigned before the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, on the \ s+ day of 
,j· \A_,0-Q_ 20 1 ?_ at C\ -0 0 
------'"""--------' -----
a.m. 
~Defendant is continued released on the bond posted. 
D Defendant's personal recognizance release is D continued D ordered. 
D Defendant's release to Pre-Trial Release Officer is D continued D ordered. 
0 YOU, THE SHERIFF OF CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, are commanded to receive into your 
custody and detain the Defendant until legally discharged. Defendant is to be admitted to bail in 
the sum of$ ________ _ 
Dated: ---"'5;_,_·?r;---·---·_,,__..6'~1=&--- Signed ~ )?:tf-
Magistrate e 
ORDER BINDING DEFENDANT OVER TO DISTRICT 05i2007 
BRYANF. TAYLOR 
CANYON COlJNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
2 4 2012 
C?.NYON COUNTY 
CATKINSON, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS 
D.O.B.
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437 
! 
INFORMATION 
POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 
Felony, I.C.37-2732(c)(l) 
BRYAN F. TAYLOR, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Canyon, 
State of Idaho, who in the name and by authority of said state prosecutes in its behalf, in proper 
person comes into the above entitled Court and informs said Court that the above name 
Defendant stands accused by this Information of crime of 
POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
Felony 
Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(l) 
INFORMATION 
committed as follows: 
That the Defendant, Matthew 0 Brooks, on or about the 1 12, 
in the County of Canyon, State ofidaho, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to-wit: 
Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 
Ali of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 37-2732(c)(l) and against the 
power, peace and dignity of the State ofidaho. 
DATED this ~ day of May, 2012. 
INFORMATION 
-W-IL_L_I_A_M_K_. F_L_E_T_C_H_E_R_fi-or---~ 
BRYAN F. TAYLOR 
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. CULET DATE: JUNE 1, 2012 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, I 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~) 
COURT MINUTES 
CASE NO: CR-2012-12437*C 
CR-2012-12215*C 
TIME: 9:00 AM. 
REPORTED BY: Laura Whiting 
DCRT51101-1107 
This having been the time heretofore set for District Court Arraignment in the 
above entitled matter, the State was represented by Mr. Gearld Wolff, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County; and the defendant appeared in court and was 
represented by counsel, Mr. Randall Grove. 
The Court determined the defendant's true name was charged and advised the 
defendant that an Information had been filed in case number CR-2012-12437*C 
charging him with the felony offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, which 
carried a maximum possible penalty of seven (7) years imprisonment and a $15,000.00 
fine. Further, the Court advised the defendant in case number CR-2012-12215*C, a 
uniformed citation had been filed charging him with traffic infractions of Failure to Signal 
COURT MINUTES 
JUNE 1, 2012 Page I 
which carried a penalty of $85.00, Failure to Display Registration, which carried a 
penalty of $96.00, Failure to Provide Proof of Liability lnsurance-1 st offense, which 
carried a penalty of $126.50; and with the misdemeanor offense of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, which carried a maximum possible penalty of one (1) year in jail and a 
$1,000.00. 
The Court addressed counsel regarding procedural issues as to the infraction 
matters being consolidated with a felony case. 
The Court advised the defendant that the sentences could run concurrent.1 
Further, there would be court costs, restitution; and additionally, if he were not a citizen 
of the United States and was convicted there could be immigration consequences, 
including deportation, denial of residency status and denial of application for United 
States citizenship. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Grove indicated the defendant had reviewed 
a copy of the Information and would waive formal reading of the same. 
The Court determined the defendant understood the nature of the charges and 
the maximum penalties. 
ln answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Grove indicated the defendant would enter 
a plea of not guilty to all charges and demand speedy trial. 
COURT MINUTES 
JUNE 1, 2012 Page 2 
The Court set the non-infraction charges for a pretrial conference on 
August 27, 2012 at 1 :30 p.m. before Judge Ryan and a three (3) day jury trial to 
commence September 25, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. before Senior Judge Morfitt. 
The Court recommended the infraction matters be dealt with separately. 
Mr. Grove expressed opinions. 
The Court noted the matters would remain consolidated this time and the 
assigned Court could subsequently address the issue. 
The Court instructed the defendant to stay in contact with his attorney. 
The defendant was continued released on the bond previously posted. 
COURT MINUTES 
JUNE 1, 2012 Page 3 
Deputy Clerk 
MARK J. Mll\!IURA 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
LARY G. SISSON 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CR-2012-12437-C 
CR-2012-12215-C 
.MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorney of record, the Canyon 
County Public Defender's Office, and hereby moves this Honorable Coun for an order 
suppressing all physical evidence, testimony, lab reports, photos, documents, any other 
type of evidence, and statements made by the defendant which were obtained by the State 
as a result of an unlawful seizure and search of the defendant and the defendant's vehicle. 
In support of this Motion Defendant states the following facts, makes the 
following allegations, and requests the following potential evidence be suppressed. 
ST ATElVIENT OF RELEV Al'lT FACTS 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
On May 12, 2012, at approximately 4:30 p.m. Trooper Blake Higley, stopped 
a blue Ford Thunderbird eastbound Interstate 84 in Canyon, County Idaho. The 
driver of the vehicle later identified himself as Matthew 0. Brooks (DOB 
 Trooper Blakely alleged pulled Mr. Brooks over because he was 
traveling well below the speed limit, namely 60 mph in a posted 75mph speed 
zone. 
However, at that time there was an automobile accident in the right hand lane of 
Interstate 84 at that location. Consequently, Mr. Brooks as well as other vehicles were 
slowing down because of the accident and moving into the left hand lane. 
As Trooper Blakely observed the vehicle traveling in the left lane, Trooper 
Blakely believed that the vehicle signaled briefly, for less than two seconds and 
changed into the right lane. The lane change was abrupt and sudden. The reason for the 
abrupt lane change was that Mr. Brooks had just safe! y cleared th.e accident and needed to 
exit the freeway at Exit 28. Mr. Brooks was traveling at approximately 55 miles per hour 
just before and as he was changing lanes. 
Upon making his initial contact with Mr. Brooks, Trooper Blakely claims to have 
seen saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat with two cigarettes 
within it. He also claims the pack of cigarettes contained a small plastic bag which 
contained a crystal substance which he believed to be methamphetamine. In his Affidavit 
of Probable Cause, Trooper Blakely does not explain how he could see a small plastic 
bag within the cigarette pack nor how he knew it contained methamphetamine. Trooper 
Blakely also claims that he could also smell the odor of marijuana in the vehicle, and 
could plainly see a small metal cone, which he believed to be the top portion of a 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
marijuana pipe sitting in the center console. Trooper Blakeiy asked Brooks 
methamphetamine use, which he denied. Trooper Blakely claims to 
using methamphetamine two months ago. Trooper Blakely reached the vehicle and 
retrieved the cigarette box containing what he believed to be methamphetamine. 
Trooper Blakely told Mr. Brooks to exit the vehicle. He placed Brooks in 
handcuffs and instructed him he was being detained. While searching the interior of the 
vehicle, Trooper Blakely claims to have found a marijuana pipe behind the diiver's seat. 
He also claims to have located a blue zipper pouch in the top zipper compartment of a 
suitcase. Within the pouch, he located two injection needles, a spoon, rubber band, and 
baggies. Trooper Blakely tested the crystal substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit 
(NIK.). The test resulted in a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. According to 
Trooper Blakely, the total gram weight was .4grams. 
Mr. Brooks is currently charged with felony possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it. 
ALLEGATIONS 
Defendant alleges the following: 
1. He was unlawfully seized when Trooper Blakely pulled his vehicle over as 
it was exiting Interstate 84. 
2. Because of that unlawful seizure, Trooper Blakely did not have a right to 
search Defendant's vehicle and it was thus an iliegal search. 
3. Even if Trooper Blakely's seizure of Defendant was lawful, there was not 
enough probable cause to justify a search of Defendant's vehicle without a 
valid search warrant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS . j 
4. Because he was unlawfully seized, and his vehicle unlawfully searched, 
any statements made by Mr. Brooks shouid suppressed because 
were obtained unlawfully. 
5. Because he was unlawfully seized, and his vehicle unlawfully searched, 
any items that could be considered either illegal or inculpatory should be 
suppressed because they were obtained unlawfully. 
POTENTIAL EVIDENCE TO BE SUPPRESSED 
Defendant has not received discovery materials such as police reports, evidence 
lists, audio and/or video recordings, etc. Nevertheless, Defendant requests that the 
following items be suppressed. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to: 
1. A pack of cigarettes 
2. A small baggy purportedly containing methamphetamine 
3. A small metal cone 
4. A marijuana pipe 
5. A blue zipper pouch A digital scale 
6. Two injection needles 
7. A spoon, 
8. A rnbber band 
9. Baggies 
10. The results of all lab testing 
Defendant also requests that any photographs, lab testing results, audio 
recordings, video recordings, and statements made by Defendant in connection with these 
matters be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
In support of this motion, Defendant will file an affidavit stating why he believes 
he was unlawfully seized and searched. Defendant reserves the right to supplement this 
Motion with a Brief and other evidence and requests a hearing and oral argument on the 
matter. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 4 
;r1,__ 
DATED this _dJ_ day of June, 2012. 
u., 
Assistant Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J 0 (v day of June, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
with~nd foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
G.}13y delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box of the attomey(s) indicated below. 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Assistant Public Defender 
( .<'[ /) J 
M.ARK J. MIMURA 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
LARY G. SISSON 
510 Arthur St. 
Ca;ldwe!L ID 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
At!orneysfor Defendanr 
I l <8<D 
___ _,....· .M. CT__./ P.M. 
2 9 2012 
CANYOf,.! C,()UNTY CLERK 
- ~ i1Hil1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO.: CR-2012-12437-C 
CR-2012-12215-C 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
TO: THE HONORABLE COURT AND THE CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, the Canyon 
County Public Defender's Office, and hereby provides his Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 12, 2012. at approximately 4:30 p.m. Trooper Blake Higley, stopped 
a blue Ford Thunderbird eastbound Interstate 84 in Canyon. County Idaho. The 
.\IE.\IOR\:\DF\I OF LAW IN SLPPORT 
OF '.\IOTION TO Sl'.PPRESS 
driver of the vehicle later identified himself as :V1atthnv 0. Brooks (DOB 
Trooper Blakely alleged pulled Mr. B s over because was 
traveling well below the speed limiL namely 60 mph in a posted 75mph speed 
zone. 
However, at that time there was an automobile accident in the right hand lane of 
Interstate 84 at that location. Consequently, Mr. Brooks as well as other vehicles were 
slowing down because of the accident and moving into the left hand lane. 
As Trooper Blakely observed the vehicle traveling in the left lane, Trooper 
Blakely believed that the vehicle signaled briefly, less than two seconds and 
changed into the right lane. The lane change was abrupt and sudden. The reason for the 
abrupt lane change was that Mr. Brooks had just safely cleared the accident and needed to 
exit the freeway at Exit 28. Mr. Brooks was traveling at approximately 55 miles per hour 
just before and as he \Vas changing lanes. 
Upon making his initial contact with Mr. Brooks, Trooper Blakely claims to have 
seen saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat with two cigarettes 
within it. He also claims the pack of cigarettes contained a small plastic bag which 
contained a crystal substance which he believed to be methamphetamine. In his Affidavit 
of Probable Cause, Trooper Blakely does not explain how he could see a small plastic 
bag within the cigarette pack nor how he knew it contained methamphetamine. Trooper 
Blakely also claims that he could also smell the odor of marijuana in the vehicle, and 
could plainly see a small metal cone, which he believed to be the top portion of a 
.\IE\IOR\NDU\l OF L\ WIN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO Sl'PPRESS 
2 
marijuana pipe sitting in the center console. Trooper Blakely asked Mr. Brooks about 
methamphetamine use, which he denied. Trooper Blakely claims Brooks later admitted to 
using methamphetamine tvvo months ago. Trooper Blakely reached in the vehicle and 
retrieved the cigarette box containing what he believed to be methamphetarnine. 
Trooper Blakely told Mr. Brooks to exit the vehicle. He placed Mr. Brooks in 
handcuffs and instructed him he was being detained. While searching the interior of the 
vehicle, Trooper Blakely claims to have found a marijuana pipe behind the driver's seat. 
He also claims to have located a blue zipper pouch in the top zipper compartment of a 
suitcase. Within the pouch, he located two injection needles, a spoon, rubber band, and 
baggies. Trooper Blakely tested the crystal substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit 
(NIK.). The test resulted 'in a presumptive positive for methamphetamine. According to 
Trooper Blakely, the total gram weight vvas .4grams. 
Mr. Brooks is currently charged with felony possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Idaho State Law 
Idaho Code, Section 49-654 states: "Basic rule and maximum speed limits. ( l) No 
person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions 
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. Consistent Yvith the 
foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and 
crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, 
\lE:VIORANDl;\I OF LAW IN Sl'PPORT 
OF :'vlOTION TO SCPPRESS 
3 
approaching a hillcrest, when traveling upon any narro\v or winding highway, and when 
special hazards exist \Vith respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason or 
highway conditions." 
Idaho Code, Section 49-655 states: '"Minimum speed regulation. No person shall drive a 
motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the nom1al and reasonable movement of traffic 
except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with the law." 
Idaho Code, Section 49-808 states, in part: ·'Turning movements and required 
signals. ( 1) No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a 
highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement can be made with 
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given 
continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before turning from a 
parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in 
all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle 
before turning (emphasis added).'' 
Searche and Seizure Law 
Article l, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution states: ·'The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated ... "unless a valid warrant is issued. The Fourth Amendment to 
Constitution of the United States contains the identical language. 
However. searches and seizures can be reasonable without a warrant under certain 
circumstances. A stop and investigatory detention is a recognized exception to the warrant 
.\lE\IOR.\NDU\I OF LAW IN Sl'PPORT 
OF .\IOTION TO SlPPRESS 
requirement. Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l, 88 S. Ct. 1868 ( 1968). Whenever an officer stops an 
individual and restrains their freedom, even momentarily, that person is seized with the meaning 
of the Folllih Amendment, and therefore, the stop and detention must comply the constitution 
standards of reasonableness. Id; J\falfer (~/Clayton. 113 Idaho 817, 819, 748 P.2d 401 (1988); 
and State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 893 P.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Warrantless searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come 
within one of the few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson. 114 Idaho 
293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988); .V!etzger, 144 Idaho at 399, 162 P.3d at 778. 
An officer may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, including any 
containers, packages or compmtments located ins~de the automobile which are capable of 
concealing the object of the search, under the following circumstances: 
(1) the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime; and 
(2) the automobile is readily mobile. 
Wyonzing v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297 ( 1999); United States v. Ross, 
456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 
( 1925); State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 979 P.2d 1199 ( 1999); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 
894, 821 P.2d 949 ( 1991 ); State v. Bottelson,102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981 ); and State 
v. Braendle, No. 24716 (Idaho Ct.App. No. 5 2/8/00). 
Probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a 
crime must be based on objective facts which would be sufficient to convince a magistrate 
to issue a warrant under similar circumstances. See Ross; Stwe v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 
'.\IE\IORA:\DDl OF LAW IN Sl;PPORT 
OF .\IOTION TO srPPRESS 
5 
934 P.2d 34 (Ct.App. 1997); Ramirez; and State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 12 L 795 P.2d 15 
(Ct.App. 1990). In determining if probable cause exists a magistrate must consider the 
officer's training and experience. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367 
(1948); Afurphy; and Ramirez. In addition, the magistrate must evaluate the facts using a 
flexible common-sense approach based on the totality of the circumstances. See Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949); and Rarnirez. Therefore, the proper 
inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the officer's circumstances would believe that 
there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence was located in a particular place. 
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983); and Shepherd. 
Evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of an individual's Fourth 
Ame.ndment rights must be suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341(1914);1\fupp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81S.Ct.1684 (1961); and 
State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the aforementioned facts and legal precedents, Defendant respectfully 
requests the Corni suppress all the evidence and statements obtained as a result of the 
searches and seizures that took place on May 12, 2012. Defendant reserves the right to 
supplement this brief with additional briefing, case law, and testi 
DATED thisdY~ay of June, 2012. 
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LA 
Assistant Public Defender 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the£day of June, 2012 served a true and coJTect copy of the 
within and foregoing document upon the following: by placing copies of the same in the 
designated courthouse box of the office(s) indicated below. 
Bryan F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell. Idaho 83605 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF lDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
CONTINUED HEARING 
STATE OF IDAHO 
-vs-
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS. 
Plaintiff 
Case No. CR2012-12437-C 
CR2012-12215-C 
Defendant. 
Date: July 23, 2012 I 2:00 p.m. 
Judge: Thomas J. Rvan 
0 True Name 
Corrected Name: 
APPEARANCES: 
0 Defendant 
0 Prosecutor- Gearld Wolff 
PROCEEDINGS: This matter shall be 
Reported By: Kim Saunders 
Recording: DCRT 4 (240-241) 
Hearing: motion to suppress 
0Defendant's Attorney - Lary Sisson 
D Interpreter -
D Other-
0 continued to the 15th day of August, 2012 at 1 :30 p.m. before Judge Ryan. 
D per stipulation of counsel D at the request of D State D Defendant/Counsel 
D to allow 
BAIL: The Defendant was 
D released on own recognizance (O.R.). 
D remanded to custody of the sheriff. 
D Bail set 
----
OTHER: __ . 
D released to pre-trial release officer. 
0 released on bond previously posted. 
--hl~-c _ __,~.,_..· _ ___ ,Deputy Clerk 
CONTINUED HEARING 08/2009 
jbt 
BRYAN F. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-73 91 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
COMES NOW, the State ofidaho, by and through its attorney, JOSHUA B. TAYLOR 
and does hereby object to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
I. Statement of Facts 
On May 12, 2012 at 4:30 in the afternoon Trooper Blake Higley saw a blue Ford 
Thunderbird headed eastbound on Interstate 84 just west of Caldwell. Trooper Higley noticed 
the Thunderbird was traveling below the speed limit. Trooper Higley confinned the speed by 
radar as 60 mph in a 75 mph zone - 15 mph below the limit. He saw the Thunderbird change 
lanes "abruptly" with a brief signal that lasted less than five seconds. Trooper Higley observed 
these actions between the Parma exit west of Caldwell to the middle Caldwell exit by the Pizza 
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Hut. Trooper Higley followed the Thunderbird for almost two-and-a-half minutes before he 
pulled it over. During the two-and-a-half minutes it appears from the video the Thunderbird 
continued to drive below the speed limit. 
The defense brief stated Mr. Brooks slowed down with other cars to avoid a crash on the 
right shoulder of the freeway. The defense, at the time it filed the motion to suppress, did not 
have the advantage of Trooper Higley's in car video. The in car video does not show a wreck on 
the shoulder of the freeway at any time from the Panna exit all the way to the Pizza Hut exit. 
Trooper Higley stopped Mr. Brooks for failing to signal for 5 seconds on a controlled 
access highway (See I.C. § 49-808). He approached the passenger side of the Thunderbird and 
helped Mr. Brooks roll down his window. Trooper Higley smelled the odor of marijuana in the 
Thunderbird, saw a small metal cone used to smoke marijuana in the center console, and saw two 
I 
cigarettes and a baggie of methamphetamine sticking out of a cigarette box on the passenger seat. 
The defendant was the only passenger in the car. Trooper Higley asked Mr. Brooks when he last 
used methamphetamine. The defendant denied any methamphetamine use. Trooper Higley 
reached inside the car and grabbed the cigarette box containing the methamphetamine and asked, 
"Then what's this?" Mr. Brooks initially denied methamphetamine use and claimed the cigarette 
pack belonged to a hitchhiker he picked up. The defendant later admitted he used 
methamphetamine. 
II. The Law and Analvsis. 
A. The seizure of the Thunderbird for a traffic stop. 
Trooper Higley had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant based 
upon the totality of the circumstances. 
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A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and thus 
implicates the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the State's by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996), citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 
653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 809 P.2d 
522 (Ct.App.1991). The traffic stop must therefore be supported by a "reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws." Id. "The 
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the 
time of the stop [and] this reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but 
more than speculation or instinct on the part of an officer." Id. citing State v. Naccarato, 126 
Idaho 10, 12 (Ct. App. 1994) overruled on other grounds by State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255 (2000) 
(emphasis added). 
I 
Thus we must determine whether, based on the "totality of the circumstances," Trooper 
Higley had a reasonable and articulable suspicion the Thunderbird was being driven contrary to 
traffic laws. Trooper Higley saw the defendant drive the Thunderbird 15 mph below the speed 
limit. The slow speed drew Trooper Higley's attention to the Thunderbird. He then saw the 
Thunderbird fail to signal for five seconds before changing lanes on a controlled access highway. 
See I.C. § 49-808. 
In addition to the stop for failing to signal for more than five seconds and for an "abrupt" 
lane change, driving slowly can be a factor in an officer's decision to pull over a car. See State v. 
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 209 (Ct.App. 1998) (holding that, even though Flowers' car never left 
his lane entirely, his weaving pattern within the lane combined with his tires touching the center 
line twice and the fog line once, in addition to his slow speed, fonned a reasonable and 
articulable reason for the stop); see also, State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct.App. 1996) 
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(finding that a combination of factors, specifically when Atkinson's left tires crossed the center 
and then touched the center line again two blocks later, provided a reasonable and articulable 
reason for the stop.). 
The failure to signal for more than five seconds by itself gave Trooper Higley a 
"reasonable and articulable suspicion" for the stop, but the slow speed also contributed to the 
reason for the stop. The slow speed and the failure to signal for five seconds combined and 
formed a driving pattern which stood out to Trooper Higley. Based on the "totality of the 
circumstances" present to Trooper Higley at that moment he decided to stop the car. Trooper 
Higley conducted a lawful traffic stop because he had a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" 
for the stop: a failure to signal for more than five seconds, an abrupt lane change, and a speed 15 
mph below the speed limit. 
B. The Seizure of the Cigarette ack. 
Trooper Higley was in a 1) lawful position to view the methamphetamine and 2) it was 
immediately apparent to Trooper Higley that the items viewed were contraband or evidence of a 
crime. See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99 (Ct.App. 2002). Finally, Trooper Higley could 
reach inside the car to seize the methamphetamine under the automobile exception to the wainnt 
requirement. See State v. Buti, 131Idaho793, (Ct.App. 1998). 
Once Trooper Higley stopped the Thunderbird and approached the passenger side 
window, the plain view doctrine allowed Trooper Higley to reach inside the car and seize the 
cigarette pack. The "plain view doctrine" applies when two conditions are met: "l) there must 
be a lawful intrusion or the officer must otherwise properly be in position to view a particular 
area, and 2) it must be immediately apparent that items viewed are contraband or evidence of a 
crime." State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99 (Ct.App. 2002); citing Horton v. California, 496 
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U.S. 128, 135-36 (1990), State v. Buti, 131Idaho793, 799 (Ct.App. 1998); v.Hagedorn, 
129 Idaho 155, 158 (Ct.App. 1996). Trooper Higley was standing outside passenger 
door of the Thunderbird on the side of a highway open to the public. Therefore, Trooper Higley 
stood "properly in a position to view a particular area." Trooper Higley could smell the odor of 
marijuana, see the metal cone of a marijuana pipe, and see two cigarettes and a baggie of what 
appeared to be meth sticking out of a cigarette pack. These items were "immediately apparent" 
to Trooper Higley as "contraband or evidence of a crime." Because Trooper Higley stood in a 
lawful place and the contraband was immediately apparent, he could then seize the items so long 
as they were in a place where he had a lawful right to be, otherwise, he would have to obtain a 
search warrant. See Buti at 799, citing Horton at 137. 
In this case, Trooper Higley did not have a lawful right to reach inside the car, but Idaho 
case law allows Trooper Higley to reach inside the car and seize the evidence under the 
"automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment. State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793 (1998). Officers 
in Buti were looking for a burglar wearing a blue sweatshirt. Id. at 795. After stopping a car 
with suspect's inside who matched the description given by the victim, an officer spotted a blue 
sweatshirt inside the car. Id. The officer reached inside the car and grabbed it. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Buti pointed out that the test for applying the "plain view" 
doctrine has yet another element: "the officer [must] have a 'lawful right of access to the object 
itself."' Buti at 799, citing Horton at 137. The court then went on to say that the officer did not 
have a lawful right of access to the sweatshirt because it was inside the suspect's car. Id. at 800. 
However, Buti then allowed the sweatshirt to be seized under the fourth amendment exception to 
the warrant requirement under the "automobile exception." Id. citing Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that the search of "a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for 
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contraband goods" is different that the search of "a store, dwelling house, or other strncture" 
because "a vehicle can be quickly moved") at 153; and State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894 ( 1). 
The facts under this case are the same. The trooper spotted methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia inside the defendant's car. The trooper still had no legal right to access the car, but 
the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement allowed the trooper to reach inside 
the car and seize the evidence without first taking the time to obtain a warrant. 
III. Conclusion 
The State respectfully requests this court to uphold Trooper Higley's stop and eventual 
seizure of the methamphetamine and marijuana pipe. 
tli~ DATED this , ......-ciay of August, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this t~ day of August, 2012, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrumenttO be served upon the attorney for the 
defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Canyon County Public Defender 
Lary Sisson, esq. 
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() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
(X) Placed in Court Basket 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
() E-Mail 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: THOMAS J. RYAN DATE: AUGUST 16, 2012 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COURT MINUTE 
CASE NO: CR2012-12437-C 
CR2012-12215-C 
TIME: 1 :30 P.M. 
DCRT4 (135-239) 
REPORTED BY: Kim Saunders 
This having been the time heretofore set for motion hearing in the above 
entitled matters, the State was represented by Mr. Josh Taylor, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho; and the defendant was not present in court and 
represented by Mr. Lary Sisson. 
The Court called the case and advised counsel the defendant had attempted to 
file documents pro se and provided the original to defense counsel and a copy to the 
State. The Court indicated it had not reviewed that motion in detail, however the Court 
believed the general thrust of the motions was that the Court lacked jurisdiction, that the 
State of Idaho was not an appropriate plaintiff, that the information in the complaint was 
defective, and several other allegations. 
COURT MINUTE 
AUGUST 14, 2012 
As there appeared to be challenges at every stage, the Court wanted it noted 
that the defendant was not present. It was the Court's understanding that Mr. Sisson 
had inquired of the Court's secretary whether the defendant could appear at this hearing 
via telephone. Mr. Sisson had been advised that the defendant was required to be 
present, although the defendant could waive his presence pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 43, which the Court reviewed for the record. 
In answer the Court's inquiry, Mr. Sisson indicated the defendant did not have 
transportation or funding to be here today. After discussing the issue with the 
defendant, the defendant chose to waive his presence. Mr. Sisson indicated he would 
be requesting a copy of the audio as well as a transcript for the defendant to review. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Sisson indicated there was a recording of 
the stop and the parties were stipulating to its admission as well as stipulating to the 
court reporter not having to take a verbatim of that recording. 
The defense's first witness, BLAKE HIGLEY, was called, sworn by the clerk and 
direct examined. 
The video of the stop was published to the Court. 
The witness was cross-examined, examined by the Court, and continued cross-
examined. 
The witness was excused. 
The Court determined neither counsel had any further testimony to present. 
Mr. Sisson presented argument in support of the motion. 
COURT MINUTE 
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The Court noted that nothing in the defense's motion raised the concerns 
expressed in Mr. Sisson's argument. 
The Court indicated that based upon the evidence, the contraband was in plain 
view of the officer, which meant the plain view doctrine provided an exception to the 
warrant requirement. However, first the officer must be lawfully making the initial 
intrusion, which defense counsel was arguing against. There was no doubt in the 
Court's mind that once they were past that threshold question, the doctrine of plain view 
applied. 
The is'sue of the language of 49-808(2) had not been raised in the briefing and 
the Court believed the State should have a fair opportunity to reply to that issue. The 
Court indicated it would allow the parties an additional fourteen (14) days to brief the 
issue of the language of 49-808(2) and would take the argument today under 
consideration. 
Mr. Taylor advised the Court Mr. Sisson had sent him an e-mail regarding this 
issue, however, he would like the time to brief the issue. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Sisson indicated he wanted to request a 
transcript and recording of this hearing. 
The Court indicated it would be easy to provide the defendant with a recording of 
this hearing. However, the Court wished to proceed with the additional briefing and 
make a decision before making a decision as to whether a transcript should be made for 
purposes of an appeal. 
COURT MINUTE 
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In answer to Mr. Sisson's inquiry, the Court indicated he could submit an order to 
provide a recording of this hearing for free to the defendant. 
Mr. Sisson requested the defendant be allowed to appear for the pre-trial 
telephonically. 
The Court noted the fourteen (14) day time period was past the date of the pre-
trial. Therefore, the Court vacated the current pre-trial and re-set the pre-trial to 
the 1 ath day of September, 2012 at 1 :30 p.m. before this Court. 
For the record, the Court admitted State's exhibit #1, the recording of the stop. 
COURT MINUTE 
AUGUST 14, 2012 
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l\1ARK J. MJMURA 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
LARY G. SISSON 
510 Arthur St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO.: CR-2012-12437-C ~ 
CR-2012-12215-C 
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
TO SUPPRESS 
TO: THE HONORABLE COURT AND THE CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY 
TE 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, the Canyon County 
Public Defender's Office, and hereby provides his Supplemental Brief in Support of Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 12, 2012, at approximately 4:30 p.m. Trooper Blake Higley, stopped a blue Ford 
Thunderbird eastbound Interstate 84 in Canyon, County Idaho. The driver of the vehicle later 
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identified himself as Matthew 0. Brooks (DOB  Trooper Blakely alleged pulled 
Mr. Brooks over because Mr. Brooks failed to provide a continuous signal for at least five (5) 
seconds prior to making a lane change on Interstate Highway 84. 
As Trooper Blakely observed the vehicle traveling in the left lane, Trooper Bla..1<:ely 
believed that the vehicle signaled briefly, for less than two seconds and changed into the right 
lane. According to Trooper Blakely, the lane change was abrupt and sudden. Mr. Brooks was 
traveling at approximately 55 miles per hour just before and as he was changing lanes. 
Upon making his initial contact with Mr. Brooks, Trooper Blakely claims to have seen 
saw a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat with two cigarettes within it. He also 
claims the pack of cigarettes contained a small plastic bag which contained a crystal substance 
which he believed to be methamphetamine. In his Affidavit of Probable Cause, Trooper Blakely 
does not explain how he could see a small plastic bag within the cigarette pack nor how he knew 
it contained methamphetamine. However, at a hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Trooper 
Blakely clarified that he was approximately 2 feet away from the pack of cigarettes, and that the 
plastic baggie and its crystal substance were plainly in his view inside the open package of 
cigarettes. 
Trooper Blakely also claims that he could also smell the odor of marijuana in the vehicle, 
and could plainly see a small metal cone, which he believed to be the top portion of a marijuana 
pipe sitting in the center console. Trooper Blakely asked Mr. Brooks about methamphetamine 
use, which he denied. Trooper Blakely claims Brooks later admitted to using methamphetamine 
two months ago. Trooper Blakely reached in the vehicle and retrieved the cigarette box 
containing what he believed to be methamphetamine. 
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Trooper Blakely told Mr. Brooks to exit the vehicle. He placed Mr. Brooks in handcuffs 
and instructed him he was being detained. While searching the interior of the vehicle, Trooper 
Blakely claims to have found a marijuana pipe behind the driver's seat. He also claims to have 
located a blue zipper pouch in the top zipper compartment of a suitcase. Within the pouch, he 
located two injection needles, a spoon, rubber band, and baggies. Trooper Blakely tested the 
crystal substance using a Narcotics Identification Kit (NIK.). The test resulted in a presumptive 
positive for methamphetamine. According to Trooper Blakely, the total gram weight was 
.4grams. 
Mr. Brooks was charged with felony possession of methamphetamii1e and possession of 
drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it. On June 29, 2012, Defendant's attorney filed a 
timely Motion to Suppress. A hearing on the Motion to S,uppress was held on August 16, 2012. 
Trooper Blakely testified at that hearing. In addition, by stipulation the parties admitted into 
evidence a video recording (also containing audio) from Trooper Higley's patrol vehicle showing 
Defendant's lane change, the stopping of the Defendant's vehicle, and Trooper Higley ta..lcing Mr. 
Brooks into custody prior to a search of Mr. Brooks' vehicle. 
At the conclusion of the Motion to Suppress Hearing, the Court gave both parties an 
additional fourteen (14) days to supplement their legal positions with briefs. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Idaho State Law 
Idaho Code, Section 49-808 states, in part: "Turning movements and required 
signals. (1) No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left upon a 
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highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the movement can be with 
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal. 
(2) signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall be given 
continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before turning from a 
parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in 
all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (JOO) feet traveled by the vehicle 
before turning (emphasis added)." 
Idaho Code, Section 73-102(1) states, in part: "The compiled laws establish the law of 
this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings 
under them are to be liberally construed, with a view to effect their objects and to promote 
justice." 
Idaho Code, Section 73-113 states, in part: "Words and phrases are construed according 
to the context and the approved usage of the language .... " 
Search and Seizure Law 
Aiticle 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution states: "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated ... " unless a valid warrant is issued. The Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States contains the identical language. 
However, searches and seizures can be reasonable without a warrant under certain 
circumstances. A stop and investigatory detention is a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). \Vbenever an officer stops an 
individual and restrains their freedom, even momentarily, that person is seized with the meaning 
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of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, the stop and detention must comply the constitution 
standards of reasonableness. Id; Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 8 819, 748 P.2d 401 (1988); 
and State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 893 P.2d 811 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Warrantless searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come 
within one of the few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson, 114 Idal10 
293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988); Metzger, 144 Idaho at 399, 162 P.3d at 778. 
An officer may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile, including any containers, 
packages or compartments located inside the automobile which are capable of concealing the 
object of the search, under the following circumstances: 
(1) the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime; and 
(2) the automobile is readily mobile. 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925); 
State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 979 P.2d 1199 (1999); State v. Gallegos, 120 IdaJ10 894, 821 
P.2d 949 (1991); State v. Bottelson,102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981); and State v. Braendle, 
No. 24716 (Idaho Ct.App. No. 5 2/8/00). 
Probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime 
must be based on objective facts which would be sufficient to convince a magistrate to issue a 
"Warrant under similar circumstances. See Ross; State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 934 P.2d 34 
(Ct.App. 1997); Ramirez; and State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 795 P.2d 15 (Ct.App. 1990). In 
determining if probable cause exists a magistrate must consider the officer's training and 
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experience. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367 (1948); Murphy; 
addition, the magistrate must evaluate the facts using a flexible common-sense approach based 
on the totality of the circumstances. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302 
(1949); and Ramirez. Therefore, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the 
officer's circumstances would believe that there was a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence was located in a particular place. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 
(1983); and Shepherd. 
Evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of an individual's Fourth 
Amendment rights must be suppressed, as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961); and State 
v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927). 
Idaho Case Law 
A statute must be construed so that effect is given to every word and clause of a statute. 
State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 417-18, 973 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Ct.App.1999). When interpreting 
the meaning of language contained in a statute, a court must interpret the statute in order to give 
effect to the legislature's intent and purpose. State v. Coleman, 128 Idaho 466, 469, 915 P.2d 28, 
31 (Ct.App.1996). There is no occasion for construction of a statute where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous. State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996). 
"The plain, obvious and rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational 
meaning." State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 40, 966 P.2d 33, 40 (Ct.App.1998). 
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To begin, a review of Idaho case law shows that neither the Idaho Court of Appeals nor 
the Idaho Supreme Court has issued an opinion interpreting the or 
required by Idaho Code, Section 49-808(2) for turning or moving a vehicle upon a highway. 1 
Consequently, applicable case precedent does not exist. 
Therefore, a review of the tum signal laws throughout the United States was undertaken 
to see if other jurisdictions have a law identical or similar to §49-808. If so, then the thought was 
perhaps their appellate courts had interpreted the meaning of their statutes which could then be 
applied in this instance. The search did not produce any applicable case precedents. However, it 
did yield not only interesting, but instructive, information about how other states require the use 
of tum signals before a driver changes lane on a highway. 
Louisiana, Kansas, Oklahoma and Wyollfing all have statutes that use the identical phrase 
contained in Idaho's statute which requires use of a signal for" ... not less than the last one 
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." Surrounding and other western states, 
such as Washington, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Colorado, California and Texas, do not have the 
exact language of Idaho's statute but they do, at a minimum, require a signal to be used for at 
least 100 feet before a vehicle turns or moves left or right. However, Utah's applicable statute 
requires at least two (2) seconds of signaling before a proper la..11e change may be made. 2 
1 State v. Debrewe, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P. 2d 388 (Idaho App. 1999) and Burton v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Idaho App. 2010) both dealt with the issue of whether a signal 
was required in certain situations. The need for using a turn signal is not an issue in this case so the 
holdings in those two cases are not applicable to this matter. 
2 Utah Code,§ 41-6a-804(1)(b) 
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On the other hand, no other state in the United States uses the phrase, " ... before turning 
a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) "'-''-'VH\.l.0 
." with regards to turning or moving from a parked position. Other states, such as Pennsylvania, 
require a signal if a vehicle is moving from a parked position.3 But, no other state requires a 
driver to signal for a specific period of time before moving from a parked position. 
Ultimately, the uniqueness of the portion ofidaho' s law regarding the turning from a 
parked position did not lead to any statutory interpretations from other jurisdictions which would 
assist the Court in this matter. 
Therefore, the Court is left to interpret §49-808(2) without the assistance of other legal 
opinions. Hence, as cited above, the statute must be construed so that effect is given to every 
word and clause of a statute. State v. Baer. When interpreting the meaning of language 
contained in a statute, a court must interpret the statute in order to give effect to the legislature's 
intent and purpose. State v. Coleman. There is no occasion for construction of a statute where 
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous. State v. McCoy. The plain, obvious and 
rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or irrational meaning. State v. 
Arrasmith. 
Subsection 1 of §49-808 should first be analyzed. This subsection states: 
"No person shall tum a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or left 
upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the 
movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate 
signal." 
3 75 Pa.C.5., §3334 
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It seems plain and unambiguous from this subsection of the statute that two requirements 
must be met by drivers when they are moving or turning vehicles on to, off of, or within 
highways. Those two requirements are the movement must be made with reasonable safety and 
an appropriate signal must be made before the movement is initiated. Moreover, those two 
requirements are the guiding principles that must be considered in order to give effect to the 
legislature's intent and purpose. 
The first sentence of Subsection 2 of §49-808 is instructive as to the legislature's intent 
and purpose in three ways. To begin, the sentence acknowledges that signal of intention should 
occur in three very distinct situations, namely: a) turning, b) moving right, and c) moving left. 
By using the conjunction "or" the legislature made it clear that in any one of these three 
scenarios a signal is necessary. 
Second, the sentence also shows that the legislature also built flexibility into the statute. 
In other words, by adding the phrase "when required" right after " ... tum or move right or left" 
the legislature contemplated that there may be a scenario when a signal may not be necessary 
before turning or moving right or left. A specific scenario was not identified because statutes -
as well as society's view of what is legal and not legal - change constantly. Therefore if there 
ever became a situation when signally was not necessary, §49-808 is prepared to deal with that 
situation without the need of it being amended. 
Third, the first sentence commands (by using the word "shall") that if a signal is required 
it must be given continuously to warn other traffic. To the chagrin of perhaps everyone involved 
in this matter, the statute does a poor job of defining the word "continuously". 
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The next key phrase in the statute says, "On controlled-access highways and before 
turning from a parked position .... " For the purposes of this case, the defendant is not 
contesting - and in fact agrees - that Interstate 84 is a controlled-access highway. However, the 
controlled-access part of the phrase is linked with the phrase "turning from a parked position" 
with the conjunction "and". 
There are a number of different definitions for the word "and". However, the plain, 
obvious and rational meaning is always preferred to any hidden, narrow or in-ational meaning. 
State v. Arrasmith. In other words, "and" means and - which is to say it is being used as a 
function word to indicate a connection between two conditions. Consequently, when a vehicle is 
both on a controlled-access highway and, while on the controlled-access highway the vehicle 
desires to move from a parked position, before turning from that parked position then (and only 
then) must the signal be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds. This interpretation 
is consistent with the mandate in Idaho Code, Section 73-113 which states, in part: "Words and 
phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language .... " 
It is anticipated that the State will argue that "the five second rule" applies in two 
separate and distinct situations. One would be when a vehicle is turning, moving right or moving 
left on a controlled access highway. The second would be when a vehicle (regardless of what 
type of highway it is on) is turning from a parked position. However, this interpretation ignores 
the plain and unambiguous reading of the statute. In addition, it assumes that writers of the 
legislation and legislators themselves did not understa11d the difference between the meaning of 
the words "and" and "or". 
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
10 
Put more simply, if the legislature wanted to the five second rule to apply to the 
aforementioned two scenarios, then they would have simply passed the statute so it would read, 
" ... On controlled-access highways, QI before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be 
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds .... " In the alternative, the legislature 
could have written Subsection 2 so it would read: 
A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall be given 
continuously to warn other traffic. A signal shall be given continuously for not 
less than five (5) seconds when: 
(a) on controlled-access highways, or (b) before turning from a parked position. 
In all other instances, a signal shall be given continuously for not less than the last 
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
However, that is not how the legislature chose how to write and pass this particular 
statute. In fact, it is arguable that they wrote this statute in its original form in order to avoid 
making it more complicated and to avoid repeating phrases such as "continuously for not less 
than." 
It should also be noted that the sentence immediately preceding the phrase in dispute, the 
legislature demonstrated its knowledge of the differences between the conjunctions "or" and 
"and" and how to use them properly. As previously explained, the legislature used the word "or" 
to make it clear that whether a vehicle was turning, moving right or moving left it had to signal 
to warn other traffic. 
The last key phrase in Subsection 2 states: " ... and, in all other instances, for not less 
than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." It is anticipated that 
the State may argue that the use of "and" between "controlled-access highway" and "from a 
parked position" and proposed by the defense is incorrect because the word "and" followed by 
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"in all other instances" is not used as a connection between two conditions. Instead the second 
"and" is being used as a supplementary explanation of a different standard a different 
situation. Therefore, the first "and" following "controlled-access highway" is also used to link a 
second situation (i.e. "from a parked position") that is unrelated to "controlled-access highway" 
but also requiring a five second signal. 
If the previous paragraph is confusing, then it adeptly illustrates that the potential 
argument found therein is not only confusing as well, but also implausible and improper. In 
other words, statutes are meant to be written so that they are easily understood. Consequently, 
explaining the meaning of a statute should also be easy. Any explanation of a statute that is not 
easily conveyed suggests that the explanation itself is not accurate. 
In any event, the last phrase of," ... and, in all other instances, for not less than the last 
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning" relates to the minimum amount of 
distance a vehicle must use a signal before turning, moving right or moving left except for the 
one situation where a vehicle is on a controlled-access highway and turning from a parked 
position. The word "and" used at the beginning of this last phrase and coupled with "in all other 
instances" is being used as a supplementary explanation to designate the standard for tum signal 
use in all other factual situations. It appears that the legislature was trying not to be too verbose 
by using the second "and" instead of more definitely delineating the standard for signaling in all 
scenanos. 
Finally, let's go back to hov; other states word their statutes in regards to using tum 
signals. It is no secret that legislative bodies often use the same language, or highly similar 
language, when writing legislation. Sometimes that is done because the template laws have 
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passed judicial scmtiny and thus become more difficult to legally challenge mher jurisdictions. 
Sometimes these laws are based on model laws researched and propagated national groups 
with expertise as to the subject matter. In other situations, it is simply easier and quicker to use 
some other states' laws as basis for writing a law in another state. 
Whatever the case may be, in regards to using turning signals the general standard in the 
western United States seems to be that a vehicle must signal for at least (100) feet before turning 
or moving right or left. A few states have added additional restrictions and one (Utah) has gone 
with a two second mle. However, for the most part these western states (including Idaho) have 
determined that 100 feet is sufficient to safely notify other driver's of a person's intent to move 
or turn. 
The facts established at the Motion to Suppress Hearing show that . Brooks was 
traveling at approximately 55 mph when he was using his tum signal and actually changing lanes 
on the highway. That means that he was traveling at approximately 80.66 feet per second. 
Officer Higley testified that Mr. Brooks signaled for less than 2 seconds. A signal for just over 1 
second (precisely 1.25 seconds) would be enough to meet the 100 foot minimum requirement in 
§49-808(2). 
It should also be noted that Idaho has carved out a unique exception to the "100 foot 
mle." Specifically, a vehicle must be on a controlled-access highway. Defendant argues that in 
addition to being on a controlled access highway, the vehicle must be turning from a parked 
position. It is certainly conceivable that a vehicle could be parked on a controlled access 
highway due to a vehicle malfunction, an accident, a road hazard, or even heavy, rush-hour 
traffic. A vehicle could be stopped in preparation for finding an opening in traffic so it could 
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merge from one controlled-access highway to another. In those types of scenarios, it would 
make sense that the legislature would require more time for signaling- especially a vehicle 
is going from a parked position into traffic that could be going as fast as 7 5 miles per hour. 
In brief summary, the plain and unambiguous reading of §49-808(2), together with the 
little tangential evidence available, does not support the conclusion that all lane changes on a 
controlled-access highway must be for a minimum of five (5) seconds. Instead, the proper 
interpretation of the statue is that all lane changes or turns, except in one specific instance, need 
only be preceded by a signal for" ... not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the 
vehicle before turning." The one exception to the "100 feet rule" would be if a vehicle is both on 
a controlled access highway and at the same time turning from a parked position. In that case 
then the "five second rule" would apply. 
In this case, Trooper Higley misunderstood the law and erroneously stopped Mr. Brooks 
even though he had signaled at least 100 feet before changing lanes. Because the stop was 
unlawful, then any evidence obtained after the stop must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the aforementioned facts and legal precedents, Defendant respectfully 
requests the Court suppress all the evidence and statements obtained as a result of the searches 
and seizures that took place on May 12, 2012. 
DATED this Jq·fvday of August, 2012. 
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IYARY G. SisSON 
Assistant Public Defender 
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I hereby certify that on theo<-_ I day of August, 2012 served a true and correct copy of the within 
and foregoing document upon the following: by placing copies of the same in the designated 
courthouse box of the office( s) indicated below. 
Bryan F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
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LARY G. SISSON 
Mimura Law Offices, 
5 Arthur St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorney for Defendant 
COUNTY 
B HATF1ELD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAL~YON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NOS. CR-2012-12437-C / 
CR-2012-12215-C 
MOTION TO APPEAR 
TELEPHONICALLY AT PRE-
TRIAL CONFERENCE 
COMES NOW Defendant, Matthew 0. Brooks, by and through his attorney of record, 
and hereby moves this honorable Court for an Order to allow Defendant to appear by telephone 
at the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled in these matter for the 18th day of September, 2012 at 1:30 
p.m. This motion is made pursuant to Rule 43 .1 of the Idaho Criminal Rules and is based on the 
following: 
1. Defendant lives in Hillsboro, Oregon; 
2. Reasonably speaking, it would take Defendant anywhere from 7 to 9 hours to 
drive to Caldwell, Idaho for the Pre-Trial Conference; 
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3. As a result of these criminal charges Defendant has lost his vehicle and Defendant 
has lost his job; 
4. Defendant is still unemployed today and still does not own a vehicle; 
5. Consequently, it would place an undue hardship upon Defendant to require him to 
personally appear for a hearing that will be relatively short; 
6. Defendant has kept in contact with Pre-Trial Release Services and has not 
violated their rules and requirments; and 
7. It is in the interest of judicial economy to grant this motion. 
:2,'J+ 
DATED this _'JU_ day of August, 2012 
MOTION TO APPEARTELEPHONICALL Y 
AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Lary G. isson 
Assistant Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the ;sof-. day of August, 2012, I served a true coITect the 
within and foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
~By depositing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of the individual listed below. 
Brian F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street, 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
~By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class. 
Matthew 0. Brooks 
603 N 1st A venue 
Hillsboro, OR 97123 
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Assistant Public Defender 
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G. SISSON 
Mimura Law Offices, PLLC 
510 Arthur St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NOS. CR-2012-12437-C / 
CR-2012-12215-C 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ALLO\VING DEFENDANT 
TO APPEAR 1'ELEPHONICALL Y 
AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to AppeavP 
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Telephonically at his Pre-Trial Conference which is scheduled for September)~, 2012 at 1:30 
p.m. After review of the motion, and there being good cause; 
THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that Matthew 0. Brooks 
may appear by telephone at the Pre-Trial Conference currently scheduled in these matters for the 
li 4 p: DO /('~ 
~day of September, 2012 at.J.6(1 p.m., or as soon thereafter as it may be heard. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Brooks' attorney shall provide to the court prior to 
the hearing the appropriate telephone number by which Defendant shall participate in the 
hearing. The Court shall initiate the telephone call to Defendant. 
ORDER ALLOWING DEFENTIANT TO APPEAR 1 
TELEPHONICALLY AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
DATED this ')l'>t day of August, 2012. 
THOMAS J. RYAN 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~{ day of August, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing document upon the following named below in the manner noted: 
By depositing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of the individual(s) listed 
below. 
Brian F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street, 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Mimura Law Offices, PLLC 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
ORDER ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO APPEAR 2 
TELEPHONICALL Y AT PRE-TRIAL COi'<FERENCE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:~ 
Deputy Clerk 
jbt 
BRYANF. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-73 91 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
The State of Idaho, by and through its attorney, Joshua B. Taylor, objects to the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress because LC. § 49-808 is not unconstitutionally vague. 
I. Legal Grounds 
The State anticipates the defense will present two objections to the constitutionality of 
LC. § 49-808. 
1. Whether LC. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague "on its face?" 
2. Whether LC. § 49-808 is unconstitutionally vague "as applied to a complainant's 
conduct?" 
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IL Legal Background 
This case asks whether LC. § 49-808 can survive an analysis under the Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process requires that all "be informed as to the 
State commands or forbids" and that "men [and women] of common intelligence" not forced 
to guess at the meaning of the criminal law. Burton v. State, Dept o/Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 
748 (Ct.App.2010); citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974); State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 
195 (1998). This is commonly referred to as the "void-for-vagueness doctrine." The void-for-
vagueness doctrine requires that 
1) A statute defining criminal conduct ... be worded with sufficient clarity and 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and 
2) The statute be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Burton, 149 Idaho at 7 46; citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497-99 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 
711 (2003); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34 (Ct.App.2009). 
In order for the statute to be "worded with sufficient clarity" it must "give adequate 
notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes." In order for 
the statute to be worded in a manner that does not allow police officers to enforce it in an 
"arbitrary and discriminatory" way, the statute must "establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement ... " Burton, 149 Idaho at 746; citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712; 1\1artin, 148 ldaho 
at 35. 
III. Applying the Law to the Facts. 
In this case, Trooper Blake Higley saw the defendant drive his car eastbound on Interstate 
84 near Caldwell, Idaho. Interstate 84 is a "controlled-access highway." See LC.§ 49-109(5)(b) 
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(Any highway or roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting and 
persons have no legal right of access to or from the highway except at such or in such 
manner as may be determined by the public authority ... ). Persons who drive cars and trucks 
down Interstate 84 may only exit and enter the freeway at specific points along the route. Traffic 
is divided into two lanes in each direction. A "barrow pit" separates each direction of traffic. 
At about 2 p.m. on May 12, 2012, Trooper Blake Higley observed the defendant driving 
his car 60 mph in a 75 mph zone. Trooper Higley watched the defendant's car and saw it change 
lanes from the left lane to the right lane without signaling for more than five seconds before 
making the lane change. Trooper Higley saw this as a violation of I.C. §49-808 and he stopped 
the defendant's car. In Trooper Higley's report he stated, "the vehicle signaled briefly [from the 
left lane], for less than two seconds and (then] changed into the right lane." He added, ''The lane 
change was abrupt and sudden." 
Trooper Higley stopped the defendant. When Trooper Higley arrived at the passenger 
side of the car, he smelled marijuana, he saw metharnphetarnine and a marijuana pipe, he reached 
into the car, seized the evidence, and arrested the defendant. 
A. Idaho Code § 49-808 is "Worded with Sufficient Clarity and Definiteness that 
Ordinary People Can Understand What Conduct is Prohibited." 
There are two separate attacks available to the defense under the Due Process Clause on a 
"void-for-vagueness" challenge. The first is that the statute is "vague on its face." The second is 
that the statute is "vague as applied to the complainant's conduct." See Burton, 149 Idaho at 
748. 
1. The statute is not "void-for-vagueness" on its face because the defense cannot 
show that the statute is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications." 
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In order to succeed on a challenge under a "void-for-vagueness" charge on the face of the 
statute, the court must find the statute is "impermissibly vague all of its applications." Village 
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455 U.S. 489 (1982). In order to interpret 
a statute, the court first begins "with an examination of its literal words." State v. Martin, 148 
Idaho at 36 (Ct.App.2009). "The statutory language is to be given its plain, obvious, and 
rational meaning." Id "A statute is to be construed as a whole without separating one provision 
from another." Id. "In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, a court 
may seek edification from the statute's legislative history and contemporaneous context at 
enactment." Id. "However, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court need 
merely apply the statue without engaging in any statutory construction." Id. "The plain meaning 
of a statute wip prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain 
meaning leads to absurd results." Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 910 (Ct.App.2005); citing 
George W Watkins Family v. lvfessenger, 188 Idaho 537, 540 (1990). 
Given the whole meaning of the statute, it applies to safe driving. The goal, as stated in 
the first paragraph of the statute, is to allow motorists to move only when doing so can be done 
"with reasonable safety" and after "giving an appropriate signal." The plain, obvious and 
rational meaning is that the statute is to be interpreted in a way to make the highways safe for 
everyone who travels upon them. The second paragraph provides, in detail, what it means to 
give an "appropriate signal" with (taking the statute as a whole again) "reasonable safety." The 
third paragraph requires brake lights and fair warnings for drivers behind us, and the fourth 
paragraph says we cannot make goofy signals (those outside of what is an "appropriate signal" -
such as letting another driver know it is safe to pass by turning on our own blinker, or.stopping 
on the side of a road with a turn signal blinker on instead of the hazard lights flashing. 
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The statute, taken as a whole, and given its plain meaning, cannot 
vague "on its face" because it is not "impermissibly vague its 
The State does not anticipate the defense will make a big argument about vague on its 
face doctrine. Rather, the State anticipates the defense will bring the thrust of its argument 
against the "vague as applied" doctrine. 
2. A person of ordinary intelligence can understand the plain, obvious and rational 
meaning of the statute, and thus, it is not void-for-vagueness as applied. 
The negative treatment of LC. § 49-808 by Burton is instructive on this issue because the 
two cases, this case and the Burton case, are factually distinct. In Burton, two lanes of travel in 
the same direction merged into one lane of travel. Burton, 149 Idaho at 750. The court 
determined that a driver could not determine what to do in that situation because the statute did 
i 
not make it clear what type of signal "is required when two lanes simply merge." Id. In this 
case, the lanes did not merge. Two lanes continued down the highway the entire time the 
Trooper followed the defendant. The defendant changed lanes from the left hand lane into the 
right hand lane without signaling for five seconds - an issue not at stake in the Burton decision. 
In fact, Burton never even considered the issue of how long a signal must be given (the issue in 
this case), but rather whether a signal needs to be given at all. 
This leads to the nitty gritty of the defense argument, the statute is vague as applied 
because it can be read in one of two ways: in one way, both a person who travels down an 
uncontrolled highway and a person who moves from a "parked position" must signal for at least 
five seconds before moving from one lane to the other; in the other way, the person must be in a 
parked position upon the "controlled-access highway" before the requirement to signal for five 
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seconds kicks in. The defense version is the latter, that a person must be "parked" along a 
"controlled-access highway" in order for the five second rule to apply. 
The defense position requires this court to overlook the statute as a whole, to deny the 
statute its "plain, obvious and rational" meaning, and to give the statute an "absurd". The plain 
language of the statute provides: 
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given 
continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before 
turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less 
than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one 
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
LC. § 49-808, emphasis added. 
This result stretches reason because everyone who has ever driven on a controlled-access 
highway would know that flying do\vn the road requires a signal of at least jive seconds. 
Controlled-access highways in Idaho have speeds up to 75 mph. At 75 mph a person travels 111 
feet per second. In order for the defendant's interpretation of the statute to be given its plain, 
obvious and rational meaning, a driver on a controlled-access highway would only have to turn 
on the blinker, count to one, and then cross from the left lane into the right lane of traffic. At 
those speeds and in that amount of time, other drivers would only, if they were lucky, be able to 
see the lane-changing driver's blinker once. (And if they were even luckier - not be in the other 
lane of travel right next to the moving driver). 
The result stretches the plain, obvious and rational meaning when we look at the 
defendant's unstated argument - that is: a person only has to give a five second signal when 
parked on a freeway. The word park should be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning: 
people "park" to go into the mall, they "parallel park," "park at an angle," and park on the side of 
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residential streets and downtown city streets. Drivers do not "park" on a freeway; 
pull over stop or run out of gas, but no one "parks" on a freeway. 
Looking at the absurdity of only requiring a five second signal when a person is ~~.,·~~ 
and parked next to a freeway, what do people do who are parallel parked in a spot next to the 
courthouse? The defendant's interpretation of the statute would put these poor driver's in the 
position where they had to driver 100 feet before turning because these drivers would fall 
the second category: "in all other instances, for not less than one hundred (100) feet ... before 
turning! Whoa to those people who park in front of the parallel parked driver who needs to get 
out of his parking spot. He will have to travel one hundred feet before he can tum because he is 
not "parked" on the side of a controlled-access highway. This means the driver would have to go 
straight for one hundred feet - over barriers, other cars, and anything else in the way before 
being able to tum - but apparently signaling all the way, thank goodness. The rational meaning 
of the statute is that turning from a parked position in any place requires five seconds because 
you cannot travel 100 feet before you turn. 
The plain, obvious and rational meaning of the statute, taken as a whole gives the statute 
a "clear and rurnmbiguous interpretation". A driver must signal for five seconds when traveling 
down a controlled-access highway, and she must also signal when turning a parked position 
anywhere (the library, the drug store, city streets, (and yes, along highways in all 
instances, she must signal for 100 feet (approaching stop signs, traveling down residential and 
city streets). The "Idaho Driver's Manual" states: "Proper signaling may prevent a rear-end 
collision. Signals must start at least 100 feet (in business or residential areas) or five seconds (on 
freeways or highways) before you tum or change lanes." "Idaho Driver's Manual, April 2011, 
p.34. 
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not given an absurd result, leads to the conclusion that the defendant was required to at 
least five seconds continuously in order to "warn other traffic", make the move with "reasonable 
safety", and to comply with the reasonable expectations of men and women of ordinary 
intelligence who would read the statute. 
The trooper's stop of the defendant should be upheld because LC. § 49-808 is not void-
for-vagueness on its face or as applied to these facts. ~ 
DATEDthis~t\~yof ~t,2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE J1' . 1 _,., ,,/ 
"IV- ~:\Uf\IU' ,)X-/Y 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this~~ Lj day of ~t, 
2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney 
for the defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Canyon County Public Defender 
Lary Sisson 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
(X) Placed in Court Basket 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
() E-Mail 
\, / ~Ov--t~--
----- f/ r JOSHUAB. TAYLOR 
V Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437-C 
CR-2012-12215-C 
ORDER TO PROVIDE AUDIO 
RECORDING 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Defendant's oral motion for Clerk 
of the Court to provide an audio recording of the Motion to Suppress hearing for these matters, 
which was held on August 16, 2012. After considering the Motion along with the previous 
proceedings in this matter, and for good cause appearing; 
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Canyon County Court 
shall provide to the Public Defender's Office an audio recording of the Motion to Suppress 
hearing for these matters, which was held on August 16, 2012. 
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AUDIO RECORDING 
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IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the above-listed audio recording 
Canyon County Public Defender's Office without cost to 
J • .fl" 
DATED this _ll'_ day of September, 2012. 
office. 
THOMAS J. RYAN 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
provided the 
I hereby certify that on the _L!}__ day of September, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the Order to Provide Audio Recording upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
ry depositing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of: 
--
Bryan F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 
~ depositing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of: 
Mimura Law Offices, PLLC 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 836605 
j:Yl3~positing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of: 
/ft!i~'? 
t. Chns Yamamoto 
Clerk of the Court 
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CHRIS YAIVIAMOTO 
Clerk of the Court 
By: --~----'='--f--; _,H-~----­
Deputy Clerk 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
MIMURA OFFICES, 
Jim Goldmann 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Phone: (208) 639-4610 
Fax: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 8124 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. CR-201 12437 
2012 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS. 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S OBJECTION 
TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Defendant. 
COMES NUW, the Defendant, by and through his attorneys record the 
Canyon County Public Defender's Office and hereby provides this Court and the State of 
Idaho, through the Canyon County Prosecutors Office, with this response to the State's 
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
On September 4, 2012, the State filed an objection only on the grounds of the 
anticipated basis of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The pertinent facts in question 
are whether Trooper Higley had cause to stop Mr. Brooks for an alleged violation LC. 
§ 49-808(2) when he observed "an abrupt and sudden" lane change after Mr. Brooks 
signaled for "less than two seconds" passing a slower moving vehicle while traveling 60 
mph in a 75 mph zone. 
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A Person Ordinary Intelligence Can Not Understand Meaning 
§ 49-808(2). 
1. Standard For Statutory Interpretation. 
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give 
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. 
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 
978 P.2d 214, 219, (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 
2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. 
Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. There is no occasion for the Court to resort 
to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation if the language is clear and 
unambiguous. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. The Court, when engaging in 
statutory construction, has a duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that 
intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. Not only must the literal words of the 
statute be examined by the Court, but also the context of the words within the statute, 
public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id. 
2. The Language Of LC.§ 49-808(2) Is Clear and Unambiguous: When Driving On 
A Controlled Access Highway And Not Turning From A Parked Position, A 
Signal Must Be Given Continuously For Not Less Than One Hundred (100) Feet. 
The State correctly argues that the Court must look to the plain, obvious and 
rational meaning of the I.C. § 49-808(2). However, the State further asks the Court to 
create an absurd result that contravenes the correct grammatical interpretation of how the 
Statute is written. Specifically, LC. § 49-808(2) states: 
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be 
given continuously to warn other traffic. On a controlled access highway 
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given 
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, 
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle 
before turning. 
The second sentence of this section is a complex sentence containing an 
independent clause with two (2) prepositional phrases modifying a noun and verb joined 
by the conjunction "and" to a dependant clause with two (2) prepositional phrases 
modifying the same noun and verb. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO -
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Splitting the sentence into its independent and dependant clauses, results the 
statements: ( 1) a controlled access highway and before turning from a 
parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for five (5) seconds"; and "In 
all other instances [on a controlled access highway], [the signal shall be given] for not 
less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." 
Beginning with the sentence preceding the conjunction, the first statement 
contains a compound prepositional phrase modifying the noun "signal". The first 
element begins with the word "on" used as a function to indicate location of something. 
For example, it is akin the following uses of the same word: "on the side of the house" 
and "on a string". The second element begins with the word "before" used 
synonymously with the phrase "in advance of' or "before". For example, it is akin to the 
following phrases: "in advance of coming to the house" or "before walking out the 
door." The conjunction "and" used in this phrase means that noun is modified by 
statements in this phrase. That is to say, the noun ,directly following is modified in the 
following manner: it takes place only on a controlled access highway and before turning 
from a parked position. 
Secondly, the independent clause includes the preposition "for" creating a 
prepositional phrase identifying the duration of time modifying the verb phrase "shall be 
given". For example, it is akin to the following uses of the same word: "for five 
minutes" and ''for more than 1 year". Taking the parts of this sentence and reordering 
them according to their correct grammatical usage results in the following: The signal 
when turning from a parked position on a controlled access highway shall be given 
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds. 
The dependant clause following conjunction includes two (2) prepositional 
phrases: (1) "in all other instances"; and (2) "for not less than the last one hundred (100) 
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." This dependant clause begins with a 
conjunction creating a relationship to information found elsewhere in the independent 
clause preceding it. 
The question now becomes, upon what does the dependant clause depend? That 
is to say, what do the prepositional phrases "in aH other instances" and "for not less than 
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning" replace and/or modify 
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from the preceding independent clause? 
\Vhen reviewing independent clause, the is to the 
prepositional phrase modifying the verb phrase in the independent clause with the 
prepositional phrase attributable to the same verb phrase in the dependant clause. In this 
case, the phrase indicating "duration of time" in the dependant clause would rationally 
replace the phrase modifying "the duration of time" in the independent clause. That is to 
say, the phrase "for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle 
before turning" in the dependant clause should replace the phrase "for not less than five 
(5) seconds" in the independent clause. 
Next, the question becomes what does the other prepositional phrase ("in other 
instances") in the dependant clause replace and/or modify in the independent clause? 
There are three (3) possibilities: 
1. Modify both parts of the prepositional phrase in the independent 
clause resulting in the following: the signal, in all other instances other 
than, on a controlled access highway when turning from a parked position 
shall be given continuously for not less than the last one hundred (I 00) 
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning; 
2. Modify only first part of the prepositional phrase in the 
independent clause ("on a controlled access highway") resulting in the 
following: the signal before turning from a parked position in all 
instances other than when on a controlled access highway shall be given 
continuously for not less than the last one hundred ( 100) feet traveled by 
the vehicle before turning. 
3. Modify only second part of the prepositional phrase in the 
independent clause ("before turning from a parked position") resulting in 
the following: the signal on a controlled access highway in all instances 
other than when turning from a parked position shall be given 
continuously for not less than the last one hundred (I 00) feet traveled by 
the vehicle before turning. 
A(2)(i) Misinterpreting- The Language ·within This Sentence Could 
Result In Non-Rational Results. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO • 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
4 
The State correctly highlights that there could be absurd results 
certain variations of possible meanings of this sentence. For example, if the sentence 
were to read "the signal, in all other instances other than on a controlled access highivay 
when tuming from a parked position shall be given continuously for not less than last 
one hundred ( 100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning, " it could potentially result 
in someone having drive one hundred (100) feet from a parked position before being able 
to tum from the parked position. As the State highlights, this would be a nonsensical 
interpretation; the Defense agrees with the State that this clearly is not an appropriate 
rational result. It is important to note that there could be rational applications of this 
sentence that are not farcical in their application; however, given the ambiguity of the 
results, this not the appropriate meaning of the Statute. 
Furthermore, it would be equally absurd if the sentence were to read "the signal 
before turning from a parked position in all instances other than when on a controlled 
I 
access highway shall be given continuously for not less than the last one h~ndred ( 100) 
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." The same aforementioned result would 
ensue. The Defense agrees with the State that this is not an appropriate meaning of the 
Statute. 
When taken in context of the sentence, the compound prepositional phrnse in the 
independent clause modifying the noun includes a location and time element ("before"). 
It is reasonable, rational and creates a clear and unambiguous meaning to modify only 
time element in the prepositional phrase in the independent clause modifying the noun 
with the appropriate time element ("in all other instances") in the dependant clause. The 
compound nature of the prepositional phrase further indicates that it is appropriate for the 
single element dependant clause to only modify a single element of the compound phrase 
in the independent clause. Given the absurd or contrary results mentioned above, there is 
only one meaning left for the dependant clause: The signal on a controlled access 
highway in all instances other than when turning from a parked position shall be given 
continuously/or not less than the last one hundred (IOO)feet traveled by the vehicle 
before turning. 
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A(2)(ii) No Reasonable Grammatical Interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2) 
Results In The State's Proffered Interoretation Of The Statute. 
Without giving any consideration to clear and unambiguous language of the 
Statute as discussed above, the State argues such things as "everyone who has ever driven 
on a controlled-access highway would know that flying down the road requires a signal 
of at least jive seconds." The State focuses its argument on possible absurd results by 
applying a misinterpretation of the plain language meaning of the Statue without 
considering the only rational clear and unambiguous meaning of the Statute: The signal 
on a controlled access highway in all instances other than when turning from a parked 
position shall be given continuously for not less than the last one hundred ( 100) feet 
traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
After ignoring the proper grammatical interpretation, the State the 
following interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2): A driver must signal for five (5) seconds 
when turning from any parke~ position and when changing lanes (turning) on a 
controlled access highway. In all other instances, a drive must signal for one hundred 
( 100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
The State then makes the leap to legislative intent in order support its explanation. 
Highlighting both the need for "reasonable safety" and the necessity for giving "an 
appropriate signal," they buttress their argument with statements from the Idaho Driver's 
Manual. The Driver's Manual, while instructive on due caution, was written with 
different language than the Statute (freeways or highways versus controlled access 
highway); it is not instructive on law. If the State's proffered interpretation were to be 
adopted, it would directly conflict with the language of the Idaho Driver's Manual. For 
example, the State wants the Court to adopt a requirement that on all non-controlled 
access highways, a driver only has to signal for one hundred (100) feet traveled by the 
vehicle before turning. The Idaho Driver's Manual would require that on any freeway or 
highway, a driver signal for five (5) seconds. 
This inherent ambiguity is not explained by the State; the State fails to explain 
why its proffered interpretation conflicts with that of the Idaho Driver's Manual. The 
State's explanation speaks for itself, it is the wrong explanation. 
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3. 
Access Highway. 
There is only one reasonable result that gives effect to the plain language meaning 
of the Statue: The signal on a controlled access highway in all instances other than when 
turning from a parked position shall be given continuously for not less than the last one 
hundred ( 100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. While the State argues that this 
result stretches reason, that this result does not afford enough time to change lanes safely, 
etc ... It does not change the fact that the Legislature deemed one hundred (100) feet an 
acceptable distance for a signal on a controlled access highway. The State fails to explain 
why their proffered interpretation completely ignores the rules of grammatical 
interpretation/structure. Given the fact that the State was unable to do so, it is reasonable 
to say that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand the plain, obvious and 
rational meaning of this Statute. 
In this case, there are only two conclusions; either, Officer Higley did not have 
probable cause to stop Mr. Brooks or this Statute, as written, is void-for-vagueness. 
Either result requires that all evidence obtained as a result of this stop be suppressed. 
DATED Monday, September 17, 2012 
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CERTIFICATE OF 
I hereby certify that on Monday, September 17, 2012, I served a true and correct 
the within Response to Objection to Motion to Suppress upon the individual(s) names 
below in the manner noted: 
IZl By placing such a copy in the Prosecutor's basket located in the Clerk's office on the 
second floor of the Canyon County Courthouse. 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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Jim~ann 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: THOMAS J. RYAN DATE: SEPTEMBER 18, 2012 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COURT MINUTE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CR2012-12437-C 
CR2012-12215-C 
TIME: 1 :30 P.M. 
DCRT4 (312-317) 
REPORTED BY: Kim Saunders 
This having been the time heretofore set for pre-trial in the above entitled 
matters, the State was represented by Mr. Josh Taylor, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for 
Canyon County, Idaho; and the defendant was not present in court and represented by 
Mr. Jim Goldmann. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Goldmann confirmed he was now handling 
these cases. 
The Court advised counsel it had signed an order allowing the defendant to 
appear telephonically and inquired vvhether the defendant's presence was required. 
Mr. Goldmann was unsure. 
The Court indicated it had received a reply brief on the pending motion to 
suppress which it had not adequately reviewed. 
COURT MINUTE 
SEPTEMBER 18, 2012 
The Court noted trial was set for the 25th day of September, 2012 and speedy 
was the 20th day of November, 2012. The Court proposed vacating that trial date and 
re-setting the matter for the 15th day of October, 2012 before Judge Morfitt with a 
continued pre-trial conference, where the defendant could appear te!ephonically, on the 
1st day of October, 2012 at 2: 15 p.m. That would allow time for the Court to consider 
the new briefing and render a decision on the motion to suppress. 
Mr. Goldmann was in agreement. 
Mr. Taylor objected as he had four (4) other cases set for trial that day and there 
was a good possibility this case would proceed to trial. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, both of counsel indicated they could be prepared 
to proceed on the 25th if the Court had the decision on the motion to suppress filing 
tomorrow at 5:00 p.m. 
The Court indicated it would contact the parties via telephonic conference if it 
was unable to render a decision by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow, otherwise the trial was to 
remain as set. 
COURT MINUTE 
SEPTEMBER 18, 2012 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. CR 2012-012437*C 
) CR 2012-012215*C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
UPON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
This matter came on for hearing on August 16, 2012 upon Defendant's motion to suppress. 
Appearing on behalf of the defendant was his counsel, Lary Sisson. Appearing on behalf of the 
State of Idaho was Canyon County deputy prosecuting attorney, Josh Taylor. Counsel was allowed 
fourteen (14) days to supplement their briefing. On August 29, 2012, the Defendant filed his 
Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress. On September 4, 2012, the State filed 
supplemental Objection. On September 17, 2012, Defense filed its Response to State's Objection to 
Motion to Suppress. Although both the State's brief and the defendant's response thereto were filed 
after the deadline set, this Court has considered all of the briefing and the legal argument presented 
at the suppression hearing, and hereby renders its decision below. 
SUMMARY OF MOTION 
Defendant seeks an order from the Court to suppress all physical evidence, testimony, lab 
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reports, photos, documents, and statements made by the defendant which were obtained by the 
State as a result of an unlawful seizure and search of the Defendant and the Defendant's vehicle. 
Trooper Blake Higley initiated a traffic stop of the Defendant on Interstate 84 
near Caldwell, Idaho. The Defendant initially drew the attention of Trooper Higley because he 
was driving at a speed of sixty (60) mph in a seventy-five (75) mph zone. Higley then observed 
the Defendant change lanes from the left lane to the right without signaling the tum for the 
requisite five (5) seconds as required by statute. LC. §49-808(2). According to the Officer, the 
Defendant signaled for approximately two seconds. 1 At that point, Trooper Higley initiated the 
stop. 
Trooper Higley approached the vehicle on the passenger side and made contact with the 
Defendant. He observed a pack of cigarettes sitting on the front passenger seat and testified that 
he also saw a small plastic bag containing what he believed to be methamphetamine sticking out 
of the cigarette pack. Additionally, Trooper Higley testified that he could smell the odor of 
marijuana and observed a small metal cone that he "knew" from his training was part of a pipe 
used to smoke marijuana. At this point, Trooper Higley reached into the vehicle and. seized the 
cigarette pack that contained what he believed to be methamphetamine. 
The Defendant was arrested and Trooper Higley conducted a search of the vehicle and 
found a marijuana pipe. He also found two syringes with injection needles, a spoon, rubber 
band, and baggies inside a suitcase located in the vehicle. 
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures. If a search or seizure is conducted without a warrant it is deemed to be 
unreasonable unless the State meets the burden of demonstrating that the search or seizure fell 
within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 
979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999); State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 302, 912 P.2d 664, 670 
(Ct.App.1995). 
Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure can be justified where two 
1 Trooper Higley testified that a vehicle traveling at a speed of 55 mph will travel 80 feet per second. Thus, a 
for two seconds travels 160 feet at 55 
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requirements are met: (1) the officer must lmvfully make an intrusion or 
properly be in a position to observe a particular area; and (2) it must be 
that the items observed are evidence of a crime or otherwise to V. 
Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 159, 922 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Ct.App.1996). 
The Court finds that the facts of this case clearly establish that the second element of this 
doctrine was met when the Trooper observed the plastic baggie containing a substance that he 
believed to be methamphetamine. 
The issue presented by the Defendant is that the Trooper did not lawfully make a traffic 
stop putting at issue the first requirement of the plain view doctrine - was 
the officer was properly in a position to observe a particular area. 
stop valid so that 
TRAFFIC STOP 
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates 
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); State v. Atkinson,, 
128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d, 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under the Fourth A.mendment, an 
officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981); S:ate v. Rawlings, 
121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 
645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). 
Here, Trooper Higley testified that the Defendant failed to use his tum signal for the 
requisite five (5) seconds as required under LC. §49-808(2). Defendant argues that under LC. §49-
808(2), the statute requires use of a tum signal for one hundred (100) feet. LC. 
provides: 
A signal of intention to tum or move right or left when required shall 
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access 
highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal 
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, 
in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) 
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
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(Emphasis added) 
Importantly, Defendant stipulates that Interstate Highway 84 is a controlled-access 
highway. Defendant argues that the five (5) second requirement applies in those situations 
when a person is initiating a turn onto a controlled-access highway from a parked position. 
Defendant focuses on a plain language argument and the use of the word "ai'1d" in the statute. 
Defendant's assertion is that if the legislature meant for the statute to require use of a tum signal for 
five (5) seconds when changing lanes on a controlled access highway, it would have used the word 
"or." If the legislature had this intention the statute would read: "On controlled-access highways or 
before turning from a parked position .... " 
Defendant points out that no Idaho case law has addressed the issue as presented in this 
case. Other cases have considered other subsections of the statute and are factually distinguishable. 
See Burton v. State Dept. of Transp. 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct.App.2010); See State v. 
Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991P.2d338 (CtApp. 1999). 
Additionally, Defendant's supplemental brie(mg provides a review of the turn signal laws 
throughout the United States. Defendant argues that other states like Louisiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, 
and Wyoming have a similar statute to Idaho's statute requiring use of a tum signal before turning 
for one hundred (100) feet. In the case of Utah the requirement is two (2) seconds. Defendant's 
purview of other state statutes, while interesting, does not provide legal precedent for this Court. 
Considering there is no case law on point, this Court must look to the plain la.11guage of the Idaho 
statute. 
The State reads the statute to require use of a tum signal for five (5) seconds in two 
different situations: (1) when changing lanes on a controlled-access highway, and (2) when making 
a tum from a parked situation. Further, the State provides a common sense argument based on 
public safety. The legislature intended to protect the public in requiring drivers to use their turn 
signals for five (5) seconds when driving at high speeds on a freeway. The State cites to the Idaho 
Driver's Ma.11ual advising that "signals must st::irt at least 100 feet (i..11 business or residential areas) 
or five seconds (on freeways or highways) before you turn or change lanes." Idaho Driver's 
Manual, April 2011, Ch. 2 pg. 9. 
As pointed out above, the Defendant argues that had the legislature intended the law to be as 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS Page4 
the State claims, it would have used the word "or" instead of"and" the last sentence 
Further, the Defendant argues that 
unconstitutionally vague. 
statute is open to either interpretation is therefore 
Ac~ALYSIS 
A. Officer's good faith belief based on plain language of statute 
Here, Trooper Higley was operating on the belief that drivers on Interstate Highway 84 are 
required to use a turn signal for five (5) seconds before changing lanes. Indeed, this Court and other 
district courts have interpreted the statute to so require.2 That is, LC. §49-808(2) requires that on 
controlled-access highways the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five ( 5) seconds. 
Defendant stipulates that he was driving on a controlled-access highway. 
If Trooper Higley' s interpretation of the law and facts before him was incorrect it could be 
considered a mistake of fact and/or a mistake oflaw. 
In Fourth Amendment applications, the reasonableness of police conduct is 
judged against an objective standard. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 291, 900 
'P .2d 196, 199 (1995). We examine whether "the facts available to the officer at 
the moment of the seizure ... [would] 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief' that the action taken was appropriate." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). See also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 
497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2801, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 161 (1990). This 
standard allows room for some mistakes on the part of police officers, so long as 
the mistakes are those of reasonable persons. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890-91 (1949). See also State v. 
Buhler, 137 Idaho 685, 688, 52 P.3d 329, 332 (Ct.App.2002); State v. McCarthy, 
133 Idaho 119, 124, 982 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct.App.1999); State v. Hawkins, 131 
Idaho 396, 401, 958 P.2d 22, 27 (Ct.App.1998). "[I]n order to satisfy the 
'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally 
demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by 
agents of the government ... is not that they always be correct, but that they 
always be reasonable." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2800, 111 
L.Ed.2d at 159. Subjective good faith on the part of the officer is not enough. As 
the United States Supreme Court has explained, "If subjective good faith alone 
were the test, the protections of the Fourth A1nendn1ent would evaporate, and the 
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the 
discretion of the police." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 
2 See State v. Roberto Diaz, CR 2012-8900*C; See State v. Michael Luka Jocolucci, CR 2012-800*C, CR 2012-
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at 906. The mistake must be one that would be made a reasonable 
acting on the facts known to the officer. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186, 110 
2793, 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d at 159-60; Hawkins, 131 Idaho at 401, 8 
In sum, a traffic stop will not violate the Fourth Amendment if 
reasonably suspects a violation of traffic laws even if later investigation dispels 
the suspicion. 
State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302-03, 246 P.3d 673, 675-76 (Ct. App. 2010), review denied 
(Jan. 24, 2011). 
The Horton Court recognized that the line between a mistake of fact and a mistake oflaw 
is not always easy to ascertain. Horton, 150 Idaho 303. In State v. 133 Idaho 119, 
982 P.2d 954 (Ct.App.1999), the Court of Appeals found an officer's mistaken belief (the 
location of a speed limit sign) to be a mistake of law. The Court discussed the split of authority 
from other jurisdictions as to whether a mistake of law can be held to be reasonable. In 
A1cCarthy, the Court did not have to decide if a mistake of law is unreasonable per se because 
the Court characterized the mistake as not objectively reasonable. Id. at 125. 
Here, if ~rooper Higley' s belief that Defendant was required to use his turn signal for 
five (5) seconds turns out to be incorrect, his mistake would most likely be characterized as a 
mistake of law. While some jurisdictions would find a mistake of law to be umeasonable per se, 
other jurisdictions would look to the standard applicable to a mistake of fact and ask if the 
mistake was objectively reasonable. Since Idaho precedent has not established the standard 
when considering a mistake of law, this Court will use the reasonableness standard. Trooper 
Higley had a good faith belief that Defendant was required to use his tum signal for five (5) 
seconds and considering the application of this statute by this Court and Judge Huskey, his 
conduct was that of a reasonable person acting under the facts known at the time. 
B. Constitutionality of Statute 
This Court cannot find any legal precedent to support Defendant's assertion that the statute 
is unconstitutionally vague on its face. In Burton v. State Dept. of Transp., supra, the Court of 
Appeals did find the statute to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts in that case. 
However, the facts of that case are unrelated and therefore inapplicable in this case. 
Defendant's response brief provides a persuasive argument in favor of its claim that the 
statute requires a signal for not less than one hundred (100) feet before turning on a controlled 
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access highway. This argument is based on a grammatical interpretation the 
dissects the statute word by word, names the grammatical parts of the sentence, and adds language 
the legislature did not include. Importai.1tly, this Court is not to an1end statutes as the 
legislature. Our Appellate Court recognizes "it is not the province of the Court to change plain 
meaning of the words used by the legislature." Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 664, 168 P .4d 40, 
48 (Ct.App.2007); See State v. Holden, 126 Idaho 755, 761, 890 P.2d 341, 347 (Ct.App.1995); See 
Barnes v. Hinton, 103 Idaho 619, 620, 651P.2d553, 554 (Ct.App.1982). A court may not legislate 
nor by statutory construction change the words of the statute to include other conduct. Id; citing In 
re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 206, 267 P. 452, 455 (1928). 
Finally, Defendant's argument that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot understand the 
plain meaning of the statute is unpersuasive. This Court looks to the common sense reading of the 
statute, the Idaho Driver's Manual, and the legislature's interest in protecting public safety. This 
Court is persuaded by the public safety argument that the legislature intended drivers on the freeway 
to use turn signals for longer periods of tin1e. It makes sense that the legislature would require 
drivers operating on our freeways at higher speeds to signal for longer than drivers all other 
instances." While not a statement of the law, the Idaho Driver's Manual does provide notice of the 
requirement to use a tum signal for five (5) seconds on controlled-access highways. 3 
Therefore, 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
-District Judge 
3 This Court that the Defendant is a licensed Idaho state DL#ZF380561E. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the 
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery: 
q\\9\l2 ' 
Da~e 
BRYAN.F. TAYLOR 
JOSH TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORl"''EY 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
MARKMIMURA 
LARY SISSON 
CANYON COUNTY PlJBLIC DEFENDER 
510 Arthur St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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TAYLOR 
COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
~OR HEARING Al~D 
OF HEARING 
COMES NOW, JOSHUA B. TAYLOR, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney the 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, State of Idaho, and hereby moves this Court for 
an Order to Shorten Time for a Motion to Continue the Jury Trial to be heard. That the is 
necessary prior to the t1ial date of September, 25th, 2012 and that the delay in filing was cause 
by expert witness unavailability and need to notify defense of the state's motion because their 
client is travelling here from Oregon. 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
1 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Notice is hereby given that a hearing on the Motion in the above entitled matter is 
scheduled for the 24th day of September, 2012, at the hour of9a.m., before the Honorable James 
C. Morfitt. 
n
11
.1 \~ DATED this · i- day of September, 2012. 
--w--~----
Deput 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
()(~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this ~ day of September, 2012, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney for 
the defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Canyon County Public Defender 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
2 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
(X) Placed in Court Basket 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
(x) E-Mail 
BRYAN F. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
JURY TRIAL AND , 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW, JOSHUA B. TAYLOR, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and hereby moves this Court for an Order vacating the 
Jury Trial herein and resetting the same for any time after October 1, 2012, for the reason that the 
state's witness will be unavailable for said Jury Trial on September, 25th, 2012. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Notice is hereby given that a hearing on the Motion filed in the above entitled matter is 
scheduled for the 24th day of September, 2012, at the hour of 9 a.m., before the Honorable Judge 
Morfitt. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 1 
CERTIFICATE OF S~RVIC:+-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this ;l-l day September, 2012, 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney for 
the defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Canyon County Public Defender 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 2 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
(X) Placed in Court Basket 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
(x) E-Mail 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: JAMES C. MORFITT DATE: SEPTEMBER 24, 2012 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) COURT MINUTE 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CASE NO. CR-2012-12437*C 
-vs- ) CR-2012-1221 S*C 
) 
) TIME: 9:00 A.M. 
MATIHEW 0. BROOKS, ) 
) REPORTED BY: Carole Bull 
Defendant. ) 
DCRT 4 (912-920) 
This having been the time heretofore set for hearing on the State's Motion to 
Shorten Time and Motion to Continue Jury Trial in the above entitled matters, the 
State was represented by Mr. Josh Taylor, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon 
County, and the defendant did not appear, but was represented by counsel, Mr. Lary 
Sisson. 
Mr. Sisson advised the Court the defendant lived outside of Oregon and the 
Court had previously allowed him to appear telephonically at previous hearings. 
However, Mr. Sisson noted that his office had been unable to contact the defendant 
regarding today's hearing and that he did not have authorization to proceed without his 
presence. 
Mr. Taylor advised the Court the basis of the State's motion to continue trial was 
that the defendant's witness would be unavailable on September 25, 2012. 
COURT MINUTES 
SEPTEMBER 24, 2012 
The Court noted it had received the State's motions, but that there was no 
supporting affidavit of which witness would not be available and why. 
Mr. Sisson clarified he did not have the defendant's authority to proceed in his 
absence on these matters. 
The Court advised counsel it would pass the matter and allow Mr. Sisson an 
opportunity to contact the defendant to see if the matter could be taken up later on the 
morning calendar. 
The Court addressed with counsel the infraction offenses that were charged in 
the companion case (CR2012-12215*C); and all parties agreed those matters should be 
severed from the felony case. The Court noted it would address the issue of the 
infraction offenses when it addressed the Motion to Shorten Time and Motion to 
Continue later today. 
The Court passed the matter at 9:20 a.m. 
Later this date at 11 :40 a.m., the clerk was advised that this matter would not be 
addressed again on today's date, but rather continued to the trial set for tomorrow, 
September 25, 2012 at 9:00 a.m., at which time the Court would address the pending 
motions. 
COURT MINUTES 
SEPTEMBER 24, 2012 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COU THE THIRD JUCICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: JAMES C. MORFITT DATE: SEPTEMBER 25, 2012 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COURT MINUTES 
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437*C 
CR-201 221 S*C 
TIME 9:00 A.M. 
REPORTED BY: Debora Kreidler 
DCRT 4 (911-918) 
This having been the time heretofore set for Jury Trial in the above entitled 
matters, the State was represented by Mr. Josh Taylor, Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys 
for Canyon County, Idaho, and the defendant was not present, however was 
represented by counsel, Mr. Jim Goldmann. 
The Court called the cases, noted the parties present and inquired. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Goldmann advised that he was not privately 
retained in this case. 
The Court noted that these cases were set for jury trial to commence on this 
date, reviewed the status conference heard the previous date and noted that the 
defendant had failed to appear for both hearings. Further, the Court reviewed the 
State's Motion to Continue and reviewed the issue of the infractions filed in the 
consolidated misdemeanor case. 
COURT MINUTES 
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012 
Mr. Goldmann advised the Court that the defendant was not advised 
that he had spoken with the defendant on the 1 sth of September and advised that the 
defendant had stated it would be difficult for him to be present. Further, Mr. Goldmann 
advised that he had not heard further from the defendant, advised that he had an 
incorrect address for the defendant and advised that Mr. Sisson had tried to call the 
defendant three (3) times on the previous date. 
The Court noted the defendant resided in Oregon. 
Mr. Goldmann concurred. 
The Court noted the defendant had previously posted bond and inquired. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Taylor requested the Court issue a bench 
warrant in these matters, advised that he would request a lower bond if the defendant 
resided in the area, however with the defendant residing in Oregon, he would request a 
higher bond to allow the defendant to be extradited if the defendant were arrested. 
Further, Mr. Taylor presented statements regarding the State not being prepared to 
proceed to jury trial on this date. 
The Court noted the defendant's previous bond was set in the amount of 
$25,000.00. 
Mr. Taylor requested a total bond in the amount of $50,000.00. 
Mr. Goldmann advised that he believed the defendant would be traveling to 
Idaho sometime due to the defendant's children residing in Idaho. 
The Court expressed opinions regarding the defendant not being present, 
reviewed previous proceedings and noted the defendant had notice of the hearings. 
COURT MINUTES 
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012 
2 
Further, the Court noted the defendant had previously entered a not guilty plea and had 
demanded speedy trial. 
The Court forfeited any bond set in these matters and issued a bench warrant 
due to the defendant's failure to appear in the amount of $50,000.00. 
The Court noted that in CR-2012-12215*C, there were three infractions filed. 
Further, the Court advised that according to Idaho Infraction Rule 3, it did not believe 
the infractions could be consolidated into the same case as a felony that was set for jury 
trial. 
Mr. Taylor reviewed the previous hearing regarding the infractions, requested the 
infractions be remanded to magistrate court and noted that the infractions did not carry 
jail time. 
Mr. Goldmann advised that he had nothing further to add regarding the 
infractions. 
The Court advised that it was not appropriate under Idaho Infraction Rule 3 to 
have infractions consolidated with a misdemeanor and a felony, 7"'"''r""1~n 
ordered the three (3} infractions in CR-2012-12215*C severed, remanded 
infractions to the clerk to magistrate court and advised that defendant was 
not entitled to the assistance of a public defender on the cases since 
they did not carry jail time. 
The Court directed Mr. Goldmann to advice the defendant of the severed 
infractions. 
COURT MINUTES 
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012 
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The Court adjourned at 9:18 a.m. 
CCURT MINUTES 
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012 
Deputy Clerk 
4 
·~,~~··~~ J. 
CANYON COUNTY DEFEI\1DER 
Lary G. Sisson 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Phone: (208) 639-4585 
Fax: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
KGQfitDILLO, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437-C 
CR-2012-12215-C 
MOTION 
APPEAL 
MATTHE\V BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, MATTHEW BROOKS, and 
through his attorney of record, the Canyon County Public Defender's Office, and hereby 
moves this Honorable Court for Permission to Appeal the Court's denial of Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress in the above-listed matters. 
This Motion is based on the following: 
1. On June 29, 2102, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress in these matters. 
2. On August 16, 2012, a hearing was held on the Motion to Suppress. 
3. On September 19, 2012, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision deny 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
MOTION FOR PE&.\1ISSION TO APPEAL 
4. Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules permission may be granted 
by the Supreme Court to appeal from an interlocutory or judgment a 
district court in a criminal action, which: 
A. is not otherwise appealable under the Appellate rules, but 
B. involves a controlling question of law and 
C. there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion, and 
D. an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially 
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation. 
5. The interlocutory order denying Defendant's motion to suppress meets all the 
criteria listed above. 
6. In addition, since Def end ant failed to appear for his trial, permission to appeal 
may be an appropriate use of time until Defendant actually appears in Idaho 
for a trial. 
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this Motion with additional 
arguments, documents and evidence. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that attorney for Defendant will bring up for 
hearing the above Motion at the Canyon County District Courthouse, 1115 Albany Street, 
Caldwell, Idaho, on the 10th day of October, 2012, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. or as soon 
thereafter as can be heard before the Honorable Thomas J. Ryan. 
DATED this_ day of September, 2012. 
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
LARY G. SISSON 
Assistant Public Defender 
OF SERVICE 
hereby certify that on __ day of September, 2012, I served a true and conect copy 
the within and foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the rnallirier noted: 
/J/ 
[Q'B y delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box of the attomey(s) indicated below. 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
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Assistant Public Defender 
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MARQ.MIMURA 
CANYON COlJNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
Lary G. Sisson 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Phone: (208) 639-4585 
Fax: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Ac~D FOR THE COlJNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437-C 
Plaintiff CR-2012-1 5-C 
vs. 
MATTHEW BROOKS, 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ORDER DENYING 1\!IOTION 
SUPPRESS 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, MATTHEW BROOKS, by and 
through his attorney of record, the Canyon County Public Defender's Office, and hereby 
moves this Honorable Court to reconsider its Order to Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress in the above-listed matters. 
This Motion is based on the following: 
1. The Court considered that the officer may have made a mistake of law when 
interpreting the meaning and application of Idaho Code, Section 49-808(2). 
2. Since the Court concluded that there is not a standard of review for a mistake 
of law in Idaho, then the Court determined that it would use a "reasonableness 
standard". 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER 
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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3. However, Defendant argues that the Court should follow the precedents 
A. The Idaho Supreme Court as set forth State v. Guzman, 
Idaho 981 (1992); and 
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as set forth in U v. Lopez-
Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) and U.S. v. King, 244 F.3d 
736 (9th Cir. 2001) 
4. In State v. Guzman, the Idaho Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule based on Article I, Section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
5. Part of the decision in U.S. v. Lopez-Soto states: We have no doubt that 
Officer Hill [the investigating officer] held his mistaken view of the law in 
good faith, but there is no good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for 
police who do not act in accordance with governing law. See United States v. 
Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). To create an exception here would 
defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive 
for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that they are 
entrusted to enforce and obey. We therefore hold that Officer Hill violated the 
Fourth Amendment when he stopped Lopez-Soto, and that the evidence 
gathered as a result of the unconstitutional stop must be suppressed. See Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963)." 
6. The final decision in U.S. v. King states: "Although Allen [the investigating 
officer] acted reasonably and his interpretation of the traffic law was 
reasonable, he was nonetheless mistaken in his belief that King's conduct 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER 
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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violated the law. Because an officer's mistake of law cannot the for 
reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, we reverse the 
denial of King's motion to suppress." 
7. The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Guzman is binding on the 
Court. 
8. Because Idaho falls within the federal jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, the decisions in U.S. v. Lopez-Soto and U.S. v. King should be 
highly persuasive to the Court. 
9. Additionally, the Court determined that Idaho Code, Section 49-808(2) is not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
10. However, the Court does not clearly, unambiguously and specifically provide 
an interpretation of the statute. 
11. More specifically, the court does not interpret how the phrase, "before turning 
from a parked position" relates to the phrase, "On controlled-access 
highways" - if it relates at all. These two phrases are connected to one 
another with the conjunction "and". 
12. Idaho case law is clear that a statute must be construed so that effect is given 
to every word and clause of a statute. State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 417-18, 
973 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Ct.App.1999) (emphasis added). 
13. Furthermore, the Court asserts that in Defendant's response brief, the 
Defendant "adds language [to the statute] that the legislature not include." 
However, the Court does not specify which words the Defendant presumably 
attempts to add to the statute. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER 
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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statute, the Idaho Driver's Manual, and the legislature's 
public safety. This Court is persuaded by the public safety argument that the 
legislature intended drivers on the freeway to use tum signals for longer 
periods of time. It makes sense that the legislature would require drivers 
operating on our freeways at higher speeds to signal for longer than drivers 'in 
all other instances.'" 
15. As strange as this may sound, "common sense" is not the standard for 
interpreting statutes. When interpreting the meaning of language contained in 
a statute, a court must interpret the statute in order to give effect to the 
legislature's intent and purpose. State v. Coleman, 128 Idaho 466, 469, 915 
P.2d 28, 31 (Ct.App.1996) (emphasis added). Besides, the famous French 
philosopher, Voltaire, correctly observed that "Common sense is not so 
common." 
16. The Idaho Driver's Manual is not a legal opinion or decision. It is certainly 
not persuasive because the actual writer of the manual, and his/her 
qualifications and/or ability to interpret Idaho statutes, is also unknown. 
17. In addition, the record is absent of any evidence or identifiable and reliable 
information that suggests that "the legislature intended drivers on the freeway 
to use tum signals for longer periods of time." In other words, in its decision 
the Court did not provide any legislative history materials supporting the 
assertion that the legislature intended for drivers to use tum signals for longer 
periods while driving on freeways. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER 
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18. It should be noted that the language for using a signal for five seconds was 
placed in the original statue (which was then 49-664) back in 1950s - at a 
time when superhighways, freeways, and large-scale interstate highways did 
not exist. The modern interstate freeway system was first initiated by the 
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956. 
Defendant reserves the right to supplement this Motion with additional 
arguments, documents and evidence. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that attorney for Defendant will bring up for 
hearing the above Motion at the Canyon County District Courthouse, 1115 Albany Street, 
Caldwell, Idaho, on the 10th day of October, 2012, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. or as soon 
thereafter as can be heard before the Honorable Thomas J. R 'an. 
01:+- ) 
DATED thisiL..J_ day of September, 2012 //3 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER 
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
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I /l ,~-
/ UL ;.J- ~ 
():.ARY G.1 SISSON 
Assistant Public Defender 
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·1·1·~ I hereby certify that on the of.. __ day of September, 2012, I served a true correct copy of 
the within and foregoing document upon the individual(s) named belovv in the manner 
~delivering copies of the same to the courthouse box of the attorney( s) indicated 
Canyon County Prosecutor's Office 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORDER 
DENY1"'G MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Assistant Public Defender 
6 
sz 
BRYAN F. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORi'\JEY 
Canyon CouI1ty Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
DENYING lVIOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
LEA VE FOR MOTION TO APPEAL 
COMES NOW, JOSHUA B. TAYLOR, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, on behalf of the State ofldaho, who objects to 
the Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Suppress and Leave for Motion to 
Appeal filed by the above named Defendant herein. 
Further the State rests on its previous briefing of the issue and Court's 
previous ruling on the recordG} ~··· 
DATED this l day of October, 2012. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
LEA VE FOR MOTION TO APPEAL 1 
JOSHUA 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this day October, 2012, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to served upon the attorney for the 
defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Canyon County Public Defender 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND LEA VE FOR MOTION TO APPEAL 2 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
(X) Placed in Court Basket 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
() E-Mail 
Depu y Prosecuting Attorney 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: THOMAS J. RYAN DATE: OCTOBER 1 2012 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) COURT MINUTE 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO: CR 2012-12437*C 
) CR 2012-12215*C 
) 
) TIME: 10:30 A.M. 
vs. ) 
) DCRT4 (1050-1056) 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, ) 
) Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Defendant. ) 
This having been the time heretofore set for motion hearing in the above 
entitled matter, the State was represented by, Mr. Casey Hemmer, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho; and the defendant was not present in court, but was 
represented by counsel, Mr. Lary Sisson. 
The Court noted the case and indicated there had been two motions filed; a 
motion to reconsider the ruling on the motion to suppress and a motion for permission to 
appeal. 
The Court further noted the case had been set for Jury Trial; however, the 
defendant had failed to appear and therefore, a warrant had been issued and remained 
COURT MINUTE 
OCTOBER 10, 2012 
outstanding. Based on the defendant's failure to appear, the Court suggested the 
motions be addressed after the defendant was taken into custody on the warrant. 
Mr. Sisson advised the Court that the defendant resides in Oregon and he was 
not able to provide the Court with any assurance that he will return to Idaho. He had 
spoken with the defendant the day the warrant was issued at which time the defendant 
indicated that he was not satisfied with the representation he was receiving. 
The Court inquired if the defendant was intentionally not entering the State of 
Idaho to avoid arrest. 
Mr. Sisson indicated that he didn't believe he was qualified to answer to Courts 
question. 
The Court indicated that it didn't believe the Motion for Permission to Appeal 
should be addressed until the Motion to Reconsider had been decided. If the Court 
denied the Motion to Reconsider the foundation would be laid for the Motion for 
Permission to Appeal. 
Mr. Sisson advised the Court that he believed the Motion to Reconsider spoke for 
itself and there was nothing more he wished to add. As for the Motion for Permission to 
Appeal, he had filed said motion to be within the time line requirements. However, if the 
Court wished to take that motion up at a later time, he would have no objection. 
The Court indicated that the time line with regard to the Motion for Permission to 
Appeal would not begin until a ruling had been made on the Motion to Reconsider. 
COURT MINUTE 
OCTOBER 10, 2012 
2 
In answer to the Courts inquiry, Mr. Hemmer indicated that Mr. Taylor had filed 
an objection to the Motion for Reconsideration in which he indicated he would submit on 
the briefing previously filed on the Motion to Suppress. 
Mr. Hemmer further noted his concern regarding the defendants' failure to return 
to the State of Idaho and didn't believe it was the best use of judicial resources to 
address these matters now while a warrant was outstanding. 
The Court noted Mr. Hemmers concerns and advised each of counsel that it 
would take the Motion to Reconsider under advisement. It would issue a ruling on the 
matter and depending on said ruling the Motion for Permission to Appeal could be 
addressed. 
COURT MINUTE 
OCTOBER 10, 2012 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. CR 2012-012437*C 
) CR 2012-012215*C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
This matter came on for hearing on October 10, 2012, upon Defendant's to 
Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Suppress, filed on September 27, 2012. Appearing on behalf 
of the defendant was his counsel, Lary Sisson. Appearing on behalf of the State of Idaho was 
Canyon County deputy prosecuting attorney, Casey Hemmer. The State filed its objection on 
October 10, 2012. Both parties rested on their previous briefing filed with the Comi and oral 
arguments on the Motion to Suppress. The Court has considered tl-}ese and hereby finds as follows. 
SUMMARY OF MOTION 
Defendant's main argument is that the Court should have applied State v. Guzman, 122 
Idaho 981 (1992) and two Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases, US. v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 
1101 (91h Cir. 2000) and US. v. King, 244 F.3d 736 (9th Circ. 2001 ). In State v. Guzman, the 
Idaho Supreme Court discussed the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as announced 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 1 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 .S. 897, 04 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 
677 (1984). In United States v. Leon, the Court decided to 
insufficiency of the affidavit in support of the warrant. The Idaho State 
despite the 
Court adopted 
the Leon good faith exception in State v. Prestvvich, 116 Idaho 959, 783 P.2d 298 (1989). 
Ultimately, the Guzman Court rejected the good faith exception as it relates to the warrant 
process on state constitutional grounds. 
ANALYSIS 
The only legal issue in dispute is the application of I.C. §49-808(2), which provides: 
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall 
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access 
highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal 
shall be given continuously for not less than (5) seconds and, 
in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) 
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning. 
(Emphasis added). 
I 
The Court sununarizes the arguments as follows. The Defense position is that Defendant 
was only required to use his tum signal for one hundred ( 100) feet, which he did; therefore, the stop 
was invalid and the evidence must be suppressed. The State's position is that Defendant was 
required to use his tum signal for five (5) seconds, which he failed to do; therefore, the stop was 
valid and the evidence is admissible. 
The question before this Court on the Motion to Suppress asked for an interpretation of I.C. 
§49-808(2). In its decision this Court said, "Here, Trooper Higley was operating on the belief that 
drivers on Interstate High way 84 are required to use a tum signal for five (5) seconds before 
changing lanes. Indeed, this Court and other district courts have interpreted the statute to so 
require. 1 That is, I.C. §49-808(2) requires that on controlled-access highways the signal shall be 
given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds." In order to clarify, this Court reads the plain 
language of I.C. §49-808(2) to require that drivers on controlled access highways must use their tum 
signal continuously for five (5) seconds before moving right or left. 
In its Memorandum Decision, this Court discussed Trooper Higley's good faith belief t..11at 
1 See State v. Roberto Diaz, CR 2012-8900*C~ See State v. lvfichaei Luka locolucci, CR 2012-800*C, CR 2012-719*C before the Honorable 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 2 
'-'"'-"""'''"LU·"' had violated I.C. §49-808(2) because he did not use his tum signal for five seconds. 
Defense counsel uses this discussion to argue that the has not precedent 
established in State v. Guzman, , v. Lopez-Soto, and U.S. v. King. 
This Court's decision on its Memorandum Decision on Motion to Suppress is not at odds 
with Guzman or the Ninth Circuit cases. Importantly, State v. Guzman addressed the good faith 
exception as it relates to the sufficiency of a warrant. This is a crucial factual distinction with 
this case. The Guzman Court discussed Article 1, § 17 that "no warrant shall issue without 
probable cause" along with the intention of the exclusionary rule. "We believe that the 
exclusionary rule should be applied in order to: 1) provide an effective remedy to persons who 
have been subjected to an unreasonable government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police 
from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing 
process; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation by 
considering evidence which has been obtained through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial 
integrity." Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. The sufficiency of a warrant is not at issue in this case. 
I 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned goals have been achieved. Because this Court finds that I.C. 
§49-808(2) required Defendant to use his turn signal for five (5) seconds, the stop and 
subsequent search (under the plain view exception as stipulated to by the parties) were 
reasonable and Trooper Higley was acting lawfully. 
The Ninth Circuit cases are also distinguishable. In US. v. Lopez-Soto, the Court said 
that the Officer was in error and had incorrectly interpreted the statute at issue. The Court said, 
"Officer Hill stopped Lopez-Soto because he had been instructed that the absence of a vehicle 
registration sticker from the rear provided a reasonable basis for suspicion of a Baja California 
code violation. That police academy training, however, was in error. In fact, the applicable Baja 
California code section directs that the sticker be displayed on the windshield." U.S. v. Lopez-
Soto, 205F.3d at 1104. Again, determining that the officer was mistaken as to the law, the US. 
v. King Court found that the defendant had not violated the law. The Court said that the officer 
was mistaken that driving with a parking placard hanging from the rearview mirror violated the 
traffic ordinance. The Court went through a plain language interpretation of the statute, 
Anchorage Municipal Code §9.36.040(D), to show that the code prohibited such a parking 
on the windshield, but not the review mirror. US. v. 244 F.3d 739-40. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 3 
While this Court's Memorandum Decision did discuss a hypothetical scenario in which 
Trooper Higley had made a mistake, Trooper Higley was not mistaken. interpreted 
law; I.C. §49-808(2) requires drivers on controlled-access highways to use their tum signal 
for five (5) seconds. Only if an Appellate Court determines that I.C. §49-808(2) requires 
otherwise would the discussion of a mistake of fact or mistake of law apply. But this discussion 
is merely dictum. 
Defendant raises other issues in his Motion to Reconsider but because of the Court's 
plain language interpretation of the statute, those points become moot. 
Therefore, 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Order Denying 
Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
'2012. 
District Judge { 
Thomas J. Ryan 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER Page 4 
I hereby ce11ify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via u Mail, 
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery: 
\t \\It \r 
Date/ ) 
BRYAN F. TAYLOR 
JOSH TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORL"'JEY 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
MARKMIMURA 
LARY SISSON 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
510 Arthur St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN Al'\TD FOR THE COUNTY OF C"u~YON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEWO. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. CR 2012-012437*C 
) CR2012-012215*C 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
The above-captioned case was set for a Jury Trial on September 25, 2012 at which time the 
Defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was issued with bond set in the amount of 
$50,000.00. On September 27, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal and a 
Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Suppress. These motions came on for hearing on 
October 10, 2012. Jv1r. Casey Hemmer, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney appeared on behalf of the 
State, and Mr. Lary Sisson appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court took the to 
Reconsider under advisement and notified counsel that in the event the Court denied the Motion to 
Reconsider, the Motion for Permission to Appeal could be addressed if it was renewed by counsel. 
On October 16, 2012, the Court issued its Order Denying Motion to Reconsider. The defense has 
not requested a hearing upon the Motion for Pemlission to Appeal. Further, the Court has reviewed 
the motion and the law applicable thereto and finds that oral argument is unnecessary. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL Page 1 
' 
Al~ALYSIS 
Idaho Appellate Rule 12 governs permissive appeal. sets 
permissive appeal. "Permission may be granted . . . to appeal from an interlocutory of a 
district court . . . which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion ai1d ii1 
which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly ,.._,..,vH.,uvu 
of the litigation." The Defendant seeks to appeal the Court's ruling on the 
interlocutory order. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 29 P.3d 949 (2001). 
of suppression, a11 
Importantly, permissive appeal is only accepted "in the most exceptional cases, with the 
intent to resolve 'substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of first 
impression."' Aardema v. US. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 789, 215 P.3d 505, 509 (2009); citing 
Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2, 4, 665 P.2d 70 I, 703 (1983) (per curiam). Also, the Court should 
consider whether the resolution of the suppression issue would be "of importance in the 
administration of the criminal justice system." State v. Bid71ell, 140 Idaho 1, 203, 91 P.Jd 
1105, 1107 (2004). This case was set for a jury trial, andr Defendant failed to appear. Defense 
counsel argues that allowing pem1issive appeal would be a good use of until Defendant 
actually appears in Idaho for a trial. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive. instance, 
if the Court grants this motion and the appeal accepted by the appellate court, the Defendant 
is arrested shortly thereafter, he may be in jail a significant a.-nount of time while appeal 
progressed. It appears to this Court that it is best for the administration of the criminal justice 
system in this case to allow it to proceed to trial following arrest of the Defendant once the 
case is adjudicated, an appeal can be taken if so desired by the Defendant. 
Therefore, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL Page 2 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion Permission to 
, I 
Dated this Jr day of Nu\IC:,iNi,,bt}v , 2012. 
District Judge j 
Thomas J. Rya...11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served upon the following via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by hand delivery: 
I 
Date/ 
BRYAi~F. TAYLOR 
JOSH TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORi~"EY 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
MARKMIMURA 
LARY SISSON 
CAt'JYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
510 Arthur St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Deputy Clerk 
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!N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF !DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF !DAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
{l/!_. JIJ/ :2. JJ.JU :f+t_ 
FELONY NCH WARRANT 
OF ARREST 
TO ,<\NY SHERIFF, COl\JSTABLE, MARSHAL, POLICEMEN, OR PEACE OFFlCER IN 
THE STATE OF IDAHO: 
The Court having this date entered it's Order for the issuance of a Bench VVarrant 
for the arrest of the above named defendant for failure to appear in Court as heretofore 
Ordered by this Court, and the defendant having previously been charged with 
fl . ') ' /J . 
VO$'')£SS:VSY1 of tl (;;n bol tt ti .dub> t {/1110 
in violation of Idaho Code Section( s )-'~.._' ._7..:,..)_1!-=3_:1_(_L_' )_(__,__) _________ _ 
a felony.~ Posges~wnDP Paraph!rflaLitL J7273ifA (1) ~ t's·d. 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED forthwith to arrest the above named 
defendant and bring said defendant before the undersigned District Court Judge, or if 
said Judge is unavailable, then before the nearest available Magistrate. This Warrant 
may be served at any time during the hours of day or night. 
BENCH WARP.ANT [FELONY} 
After considering the facts pertaining to the defendant the crime, the bail is 
-::- ~ 
set in the amount of sol 0 90 ---·-. 
,Y'f' 
Dated this akJ7 day of S-<¢t1r;1 b-ef '201~ 
District Ju~ 
Race: 
------
Height b 1D) 
SSN:
Hair: J}vp}Ulll 
Weight: /JO fJDunds 
I 
Eyes: -~llJlAJ() 
oos: 
Agency: -----·----
RETURN 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Canyon 
) 
) 
SS. 
l HEREBY CERTIFY that l received this Warrant on 
~-----------
and served the said Warrant by arresting the within named defendant 
on -------------
(Name) 
(Title) 
BENCH WARRANT [FELONY] 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
[8J ARRAIGNMENT [8J iN-CUSTODY 0 SENTENCING I CHANGE OF PLEA 
Case No. CR-2012-12215-C 
-vs-
MATTHEW BROOKS 
0 True Name 
Corrected Name: 
APPEARANCES: 
0 Defendant 
0 Defendant's Attorney 0 
Plaintiff 
Defendant. 
Date: 2/21 /2013 
Judge: SCHILLER 
Recording: MAG 7 (140-143) 
!8J Prosecutor Kimberlee Bratcher 
0 Interpreter 
0 FAILURE TO APPEAR: Defendant failed to appear. It is Ordered: 
D bench warrant issued D bail on warrant $ 
D bail forfeited D referred to PA 
ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS: Defendant 
[8J was informed of the charges against him/her and all legal rights, including the right to be represented by 
counsel. 
[8J requested court appointed counsel. 0 waived right to counsel. 
l'Z'.l lndigency hearing held. 
['Z'.J Court appointed public defender. D Court denied court-appointed counsel. 
[8J District Court Arraignment: March 1, 2013 at 9:00 am before Judge Huskey 
BAIL: State recommends 
D Released on written citation promise to appear 
D Released on own recognizance (O.R.) 
D Released to pre-trial release officer. 
D No Contact Order D entered D continued 
D Address Verified 
OTHER: 
ARRAIGNMENT I FIRST APPEARANCE 
D Released on bond previously posted. 
[8J Remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 
[8J Bail set at $50,000 total continued 
[8J Continued Consolidated 
0 Corrected Address __ 
~~,Deputy Clerk 
07/2009 
FILED -----''H--'--~~t--­
CLERK 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON BY~-\:-~~~-.!:~~~~ff::l'qmcy 
THE STATE OF IDAHO/or 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of the above-named applicant and it appearing to 
be a proper case. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Public Defender be. and hereby is. appointed for 
·.~THE MATTER IS SET FOR 
In Custody -- Bond$ 
Released: D O.R. 
vr· ) 
D on bond previously posted 
D to PreTriaf Release 
Juvenile: D In Custody 
D Released to 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
D No Contact Order entered. 
iXi Cases consolidated.[C,O((Li{) 
D Discovery provided by State. 
D Interpreter required. 
D Additional charge of FT A. 
Original--Court File 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
YeHow--Public Defender Pink--Prosecuting Attorney 
2106 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
I 
PRESIDING: 1 DENNIS E. GOFF DATE: MARCH 1, 2013 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant, 
COURT MINUTES 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437-C 
CR2012-12215-C 
TIME: 9:00 A.M. 
DCRT5 (1208-1210) 
REPORTED BY: Laura Whiting 
This having been the time heretofore set for arraignment in the above entitled 
matters, the State was represented by Ms. Lisa Donnell, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
for Canyon County, and the defendant appeared in court with counsel, Mr. Lary Sisson. 
The Court called the case and noted a motion for an interlocutory appeal had 
been denied as well as a motion to reconsider, therefore, this matter to set 
for a jury trial. 
The Court set this matter for jury trial commencing on the 23rd day of 
2013 at 8:30 a.m. before Judge Morfitt. 
The defendant was instructed to remain in contact with his attorney and was 
remanded into the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff pending further proceeding or 
posting of bond. 
COURT MINUTES 
MARCH 1, 2013 
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Robyn Fyffe, ISB #7063 
BENJAMIN, 
303 Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: 208-343-1000 
Facsimile: 208-345-8274 
Email: rfyffe@nbmlaw.com 
& LLP 
Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc. dba Aladdin Bail Bonds/ Anytime Bail Bonds 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAN"YON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, 
and 
) 
) 
Plaintiff,) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant,) 
) 
ALADDIN BAIL BONDS as agent for 
DANIELSON NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Surety/Real-Party in Interest. ) 
~~~~~~~~~-) 
Case No.: CR-2012-12437-C 
Bond No.: DN25-2767140 
Bond Amount: $25,000.00 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
FORFEITURE AND 
EXONERATE BOND AND 
CONDITIONAL REQUEST 
FOR 
Two Jinn, Inc., by and through its counsel ofrecord, Robyn Fyffe, hereby moves this 
Court, pursuant to I.C. §19-2922(5) to set aside the September 25, 2012 forfeiture and exonerate 
this bond in the above-referenced case. This Motion is based upon the fact the Defendant 
appeared in Court on February 21, 2013 and March 1, 2013 to be arraigned, which dates are prior 
to the 180th day after the forfeiture of the above-mentioned bond. See Court ROA. 
1 • MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND AND 
CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR HEARING 
The Court shall exonerate when a defendant appears court 
days of the forfeiture. LC.§ 19-2922(5). On February 21, 2013 and March , 2013, the 
Defendant appeared before the Court and was arraigned. The 180th day after the court forfeited 
this bond will be March 24, 2013 and the Court should therefore exonerate bond based on the 
Defendant's February 21, 2013 and March 1, 2013 appearances. 
Although the Court can condition the exoneration of the bond pursuant to I. C. § 19-
2922(5) on the bail agent's payment of transportation costs, it appears that neither the 
prosecuting attorney nor state or local law enforcement are requesting reimbursement for any 
transportation costs in this case. Idaho Criminal Rule 46(k)(l) provides that transportation "costs 
shall be determined by the court following filing within fourteen (14) days of the defendants 
return, by either the prosecuting attorney or a representative of the state or local law enforcement 
entity, of documentation of the costs actually incurred." The fourteenth day after the Defendant 
first appeared in Court was March 7, 2013 and no request for costs pursuant to I.C.R. 46(k)(1) 
has been filed. See Court ROA. Aladdin thus assumes no transportation costs are being 
requested. 
Accordingly, the Court should set aside the September 25, 2012 forfeiture and exonerate 
this bond. Should the Court, for any reason, determine that this Motion should be denied, it is 
respectfully requested that the Court set this matter for a hearing at a mutually convenient date 
and time. See attached unavailable dates for Robyn Fyffe through June, 2013. 
2 • MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND AND 
CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR HEARING 
DATED this /2 day of March, 2013. 
~JN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
/'Robyn Fyffe 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \~y of March, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Canyon County Public Defender 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
[__] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[__] Hand Delivery 
ffiJ Court House Basket 
[__] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[__] Overnight Mail 
[__] Facsimile: 208-454-7474 
[__] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[__] Hand Delivery 
UJ Court House Basket 
[__] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[__] Overnight Mail 
[__] Facsimile: 208-639-4611 
~ ~ ~- \ I, ,, ~tl~~~ hl-02 
Heather Price 
3 • MOTION TO SET ASIDE FORFEITURE AND EXONERATE BOND AND 
CONDITIONAL REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Id?tho Repository - Case Numb sult Page 
Case Number Result 
Canyon 
1 Cases Found. 
I 
! CR-2012-
'Case: 0012437-C 
State of Idaho vs. Matthew O Brooks 
Next hearing scheduled: 04/23/2013 8:30 AM 
D"st . t J d . Thomas J Amount$O 00 I r1c u ge. Ryan due: • Pending 
Charges: Violation Date Charge Citation Degree Disposition 
Felony 05/12/2012 I37-2732(C)(l) 
Controlled Substance-
Possession of 
Officer: CC Sheriff's 
Office11 CCSO I Pending Date/Time Judge 
I hearings: Hearing Type 
I 04/23/2013 ' 8 :30 AM James C. Morf1tt Jury Trial 
I Register i of Date I actions: I 05/14/2012 New Case Filed-Felony 
1 05/14/2012 Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
t 
05/14/2012 Criminal Complaint 
0511412012 Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 05/14/2012 01:32 
I!,!: PM) 
. 0511412012 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Hearing Held I 0511412012 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Arraignment I First Appearance 
0511412012 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Constitutional Rights Warning 
0511412012 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender 
0511412012 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Consolidation Of Files w/CR2012-12215*C 
0511412012 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 05/14/2012 01:32 PM: Commitment On Bond/$251 000.00 
05/14/2012 Change Assigned Judge 
05/14/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 05/24/2012 08:30 AM) 
05/15/2012 Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 25000.00) 
05/15/2012 Notice of Bond Posted 
05/15/2012 PA's Response For Request For Discovery 
05/15/2012 Request For Discovery 
05/15/2012 Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi 
05/16/2012 Waiver Of Extradition 
0512412012 Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Hearing Held 
0512412012 Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Preliminary Hearing Waived (bound Over) 
0512412012 Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 05/24/2012 08:30 AM: Order Binding Defendant Over to District Court 
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05/24/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 06/01/2012 09:00 AM) 
05/24/2012 Information 
0610112012 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Laura Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 
06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Hearing Held RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1:30-RYAN-JT-SEPT 25-
27@9:00-MORFITT 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 
06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Arraignment I First Appearance RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1:30-
RYAN-JT-SEPT 25-27@9:00-MORFITT 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 06/01/2012 
06/01/2012 09:03 AM: Appear & Plead Not Guilty RYAN-PT-AUG 27@1:30-RYAN-
JT-SEPT 25-27@9:00-MORFITT 
06/01/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 08/27/2012 01:30 PM) 
06/01/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/25/2012 09:00 AM) 
06/01/2012 Notice Of Hearing 
06/05/2012 Request For Discovery 
06/29/2012 Motion to Suppress 
06/29/2012 Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion To Suppress 
06/29/2012 Notice Of Hearing 
0612912012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/23/2012 02:00 PM) Motion to Suppress 
0712312012 Hearing r.esult for ~otion Hearing scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00 PM: Continued Motion to Suppress • 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 07/23/2012 02:00 
07/23/2012 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
0712312012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/16/2012 01:30 PM) to 
suppress 
08/02/2012 Pa's First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
08/09/2012 Pa's Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
08/14/2012 Objection To Motion To Suppress Evidence 
08/15/2012 papers/Notice and Demand For Abatement 
0811612012 Hear!ng result for Pre Trial scheduled on 08/27/2012 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
0811612012 Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/16/2012 01:30 PM: Hearing Held to suppress - 14 days for additional briefing 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/16/2012 01:30 
08/16/2012 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
08/16/2012 Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 09/18/2012 01 :30 PM) 
08/24/2012 Pa's Third Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
08/29/2012 Defendant's Supplemental Brief In Support Of Motion To Suppress 
08/30/2012 Motion To Appear Telephonically At Pre-Trial Conference 
08/31/2012 Order allowing def to appear telephonically at PT conference 
0813112012 Hear!ng result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
0813112012 Hearing ~cheduled (Pre Trial 09/18/2012 03:00 PM) Def to appear Telephonically 
09/04/2012 Objection to motion to suppress evidence 
09/10/2012 Order to Provide Auto Recording without Cost 
09/17/2012 Response to State's Objection to Motion to Suppress 
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0911812012 Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Def to appear Telephonically 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 09/18/2012 03:00 PM: 
09/18/2012 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Kim Saunders Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
09/19/2012 Memorandum decision upon motion to suppress 
09/21/2012 Pa's Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
09/21/2012 Motion To Shorten Time For Hearing And Notice Of Hearing 
09/21/2012 Motion To Continue JT And Notice Of Hearing 
0912112012 Hearing ~chedule~ (Motion ~earing 09/24/2012 09:00 AM) motion to 
shorten time, motion to continue 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 
0912412012 AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Carole Bull Number 
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
motion to shorten time, motion to continue 
0912412012 Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing Held motion to shorten time, motion to continue 
0912412012 Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 09/24/2012 09:00 AM: Continued motion to shorten time, motion to continue 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/25/2012 09:00 AM: 
0912512012 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Debora Kreidler Number 
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
State's Mo to Shorten Time I to Continue 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 09/25/2012 09:00 AM: 
09/25/2012 Failure To Appear For Hearing Or Trial State's Mo to Shorten Time/ 
to Continue 
09/25/2012 Notice of Bond Forfeiture 
0912512012 Warrant Issued - Bench Bond amount: 50000.00 Failure to Appear-total bond with CR-2012-12215*C Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0 
09/25/2012 Case Status Changed: Inactive 
09/27 /2012 Motion to reconside order denying motion to suppress 
09/27/2012 Motion for permission to appeal 
09/27/2012 Case Status Changed: Reopened 
0912712012 Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/10/2012 10:30 AM) Motn for Permission to Appeal/ Motn to Reconsider 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/10/2012 10:30 
lO/l0/2012 AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter:Kim Saunders Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
lO/l0/2012 Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/10/2012 10:30 AM: Hearing Held Motn for Permission to Appeal/ Motn to Reconsider 
10/10/2012 Motion Held - Motn to Reconsider 
lO/l0/2012 m~tion to reconsider taken under advisement-court to issue written 
ruling 
lO/l0/2012 Objection to Motion for ~econsideration of Order Denying Motion to Supress & Leave for Motion to Appeal 
10/16/2012 Order Denying Motion to Reconsider 
11/19/2012 Order Denying Motion For Permission to Appeal 
0211112013 Warrant Returned Failure to Appear-total bond with CR-2012-12215*C Defendant: Brooks, Matthew 0/ served in Hillsboro Oregon 
02/11/2013 Inactive 
02/11/2013 Case Status Changed: Inactive 
02/21/2013 status changed to Active 
3 of 
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02/21/2013 Case Status Changed: Pending 
0212112013 Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 02/21/2013 01:30 PM) 
0212112013 ~~)ring Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 02/21/2013 01:30 
0212112013 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
0212112013 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013 01:30 PM: Arraignment I First Appearance 
0212112013 Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 02/21/2013 01:30 PM: Order Appointing Public Defender 
02/21/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 03/01/2013 09:00 AM) 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 03/01/2013 
03/01/2013 09:07 AM: Hearing Held RYAN-FTA-JURY TRIALJT-MARCH 
508@8:30-MORFITT JT-APRIL 23-26@8:30-MORFITT 
03/01/2013 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/23/2013 08:30 AM) 
0310112013 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Laura Whiting Number of I Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
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IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUCICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: RENAE J. HOFF DATE: MARCH 15, 2013 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COURT MINUTES 
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437*C 
CR-2012-12215*C 
TIME 1 :30 P.M. 
REPORTED BY: Kathy Klemetson 
DCRT 5 (201-214) 
This having been the time heretofore set for Change of Plea Hearing in the 
above entitled matters, the State was represented by Mr. Gearld Wolff, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho, and the defendant was present in 
court, represented by counsel, Mr. Lary Sisson. 
The Court called the case, reviewed the pending charges and inquired. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Sisson advised that the cases were 
Possession of a Controlled Substance CR-2012-1 consolidated 
misdemeanor offenses in CR-2012-12215*C \Nould be dismissed and the 
defendant would be released to pretrial release services pending sentencing. 
Further, Mr. Sisson advised that as long as the defendant no prior felony 
offenses, the State would recommend probation. Mr. Sisson reviewed 
COURT MINUTES 
MARCH 15, 2013 
previous Motion to Suppress that had been denied, plea 
in this case would be conditional and the defendant would appealing 
Motion to Suppress. 
Mr. Wolff concurred. 
The defendant concurred and was sworn in by the clerk. 
Mr. Sisson submitted a Guilty Plea Advisory Form. 
The Court examined the defendant, determined the defendant read and 
understood the English language, had attended school through the eighth grade and 
was twenty-seven (27) years of age. Further, the Court determined that this was the 
defendant's first felony offense, determined the defendant recalled the maximum 
possible penalty and determined the defendant had not consumed any medication 
within the past twenty-four (24) hours. The Court determined the defendant had no 
mental conditions, determined the defendant had never attended substance abuse 
treatment and determined the defendant was not under the influence of any intoxicating 
substances. 
The Court reviewed the previous Motion to Suppress, noted that the defendant 
would be appealing the decision on the Motion to Suppress and advised that if the 
defendant's appeal was granted, he could come back and re-address this case. The 
Court further advised that the defendant was pleading guilty to a felony offense, 
determined the defendant had decided to plead guilty two (2) weeks previously and 
noted that the Court had previously denied the Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
COURT MINUTES 
MARCH 15, 2013 
2 
The Court reviewed the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance, 
determined that laboratoiy testing had been completed on the substance and advised 
the defendant that he could be ordered to pay restitution for said testing. 
Mr. Sisson advised that he had explained the defendant he would be 
ordered to pay restitution, advised that the defendant was well aware of the facts in this 
case and advised that there was a factual basis for a plea of guilty. Further, Mr. Sisson 
advised that the defendant made incriminating statements at the time of the arrest. 
The Court advised the defendant that if he was not a citizen of the United States 
and pied guilty, or was found guilty of any criminal offense, it could have immigration 
I 
consequences to include, deportation from the United States, inability to obtain legal 
status in the United States, or denial of an application for United States citizenship. 
The Court advised the defendant that by entering a plea of guilty in this case, he 
would be waiving his right to remain silent, he would be waiving his right to subpoena 
witnesses on his own behalf, examined the defendant and determined there had been 
no promises or threats and advised the defendant that by entering a plea of guilty, he 
would be waiving his right to remain silent. 
The Court examined the defendant and determined that he had not been 
diagnosed with a mental illness. 
The Court examined the defendant and in answer to the Court's inquiiy, 
defendant entered a plea of guilty to the felony offense of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance. 
COURT MINUTES 
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3 
The Court examined the defendant and in answer to the Court's inquiry, the 
defendant advised of his Oregon address. 
The Court inquired if the defendant could be supervised by pretrial release when 
he resided in another state. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Wolff advised that pretrial release could 
supervise the defendant in Oregon. 
The Court advised the defendant that he would need to arrange transportation to 
complete his Presentence Investigation Report, advised the defendant of the 
importance of the Presentence Investigation Report and inquired. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Wolff advised that the office fer pretrial 
release was open until 5:00 p.m. on this date. 
The Court advised that the offices for District Ill Probation and Parole was dosed 
until the following Monday. 
Mr. Sisson advised the Court that the defendant had children residing in the area 
and advised that he could stay with them. 
A woman in the audience advised that the defendant would not be permitted to 
live at the house with their children. 
The Court expressed opinions. 
Mr. Sisson made responding statements. 
The Court advised the defendant that he would be ordered released to pretrial 
release services at 8:00 a.m. on Monday, March 18, 2013 and ordered the defendant to 
immediately report to Pretrial Release Services and District Ill Probation and Parole to 
COURT MINUTES 
MARCH 15, 2013 
4 
schedule his appointment for the Presentence Investigation Report. Court 
a Presentence Investigation Report be prepared in this matter and set this matter for 
Sentencing on May 6, 2013 2:15 p.m. before Judge Ryan. 
Mr. Sisson requested the Court order a 19-2524 Substance Abuse Assessment 
as well. 
The Court ordered a 19-2524 Substance Abuse Assessment to be completed 
as well. 
The defendant was remanded to the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff, to be 
released to pretrial release services on March 18, 2013 at 8:00 a.m. 
COURT MINUTES 
MARCH 15, 2013 
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, ulLf!/)itvte{ 
Deputy Clerk 
GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY 
Defendant's Name: MATTHEW BROOKS 
Date: Case No. CR-2012-12437-C 
Nature of Charge(s): Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: 
Possession of a Controlled 
Substance (Methamphetamine) 
imprisoned for not more than 7 years, or 
fined not more than $15,000, or both; 100 
hours of community service. 
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA OF GUILTY 
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE) 
i 
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything about 
the crime(s) you are accused of committing. If you elected to have a trial, the 
state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions. However, 
anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent 
before and during trial. _N,_, 1'.~\)~--
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to 
the crime(s) in this case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the 
right to refuse to answer any question or to provide any information that might 
tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to 
answer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment 
for the crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the 
right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to 
answering questions or providing information that may increase my 
sentence. f'\i) . 
3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney 
and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who will be 
paid by the county. -~---D,___ _ 
You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: ) 
guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty a ju 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed 
innocent. ~ 
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court 
hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) 
brought against you. In a jury trial, you have the right to present evidence in 
your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must convince 
each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy 
public jury trial. M\~ . 
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs during 
a jury trial where the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify 
under oath in front of you, the jury, and your attorney. Your attorney could 
then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could also call your own 
witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or innocence. If 
you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, ,the state will pay 
the cost of bringing your witnesses to court. · 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront the 
witnesses against me, an present witnesses and evidence in my defense. ~\S, . 
REGARDING PLEA 
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question consult 
your attorney before answering.) 
1. Do you read and write the English language? 
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to help 
you fill out this form? 
2. What is your age? Q_ 1 
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
YES 
3. What is your true and legal name? fVloJ-th.c.v oL/V:e.f' bSJM;-ol{Q. 
4. What was the highest grade you completed? 
If you did not complete high school, have you received 
2 
a general education diploma or high school 
equivalency diploma? 
Are you currently under the care of a mental health 
professional? 
Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health 
disorder? 
YES 
YES 
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? ________ _ 
7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? 
If so, have you taken your prescription medication 
during the past 24 hours? 
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken any medications or 
drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages which you 
believe affect your ability to make a reasoned and 
informed decision in this case? 
9. Is there any other reason that you would be unable to 
make a reasoned and informed decision in this case? 
1 O. ls your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? 
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement? 
(If available, a written plea agreement should be 
attached hereto as "Addendum 'A"') 
YES 
YES 
YES 
If Defendant pleads guilty to felony Possession of a Controlled Substance, then the 
State agrees to dismiss all other charges, release defendant to pre-trial release 
services and recommend Defendant is also allowed to enter a con-
ditiona! guilty plea so he can appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress. 
11. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial 
the one paragraph below which describes the type of 
plea you are entering: 
a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement. 
This means that if the district court does not impose the specific 
sentence as recommended by both parties, I will be allowed to 
withdraw my plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial. ___ _ 
3 
I understand that plea agreement is a non-binding plea 
agreement. This means that the court is not bound the 
agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose 
any sentence authorized law, including the maximum sentence 
stated above. Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if 
the district court chooses not to follow the agreement, I not 
have the right to withdraw my guilty plea. !V\\S . 
12.As a term of your plea agreement, are you pleading 
guilty to more than one crime? 
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each 
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently 
(at the same time) or consecutively (one after the 
other)? 
YES 
YES 
13. ls this a conditional guilty plea in which you are ~'] 
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues? e> 
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appeal? 
NO 
·ik Ct1tu~ s dOVI rq_Q ol DerbJalj,Js bl1ohllfi 4 S4n{fe5S < 
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment of 
conviction and sentence as part of your plea 
agreement? 
15. Have any other promises been made to you which have 
influenced your decision to plead guilty? 
If so, what are those promises? 
16. Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss your 
case with your attorney? 
17. Have you told your attorney everything you know about 
the crime? 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
18. ls there anything you have requested your attorney to ~ /.:1 
do that has not been done? YES ~ 
4 
If yes, please explain.---------------------
19. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor 
relating to your case. This may include police reports, 
witness statements, tape recordings, photographs, 
reports of scientific testing, etc. This is called discovery. 
Have you reviewed the evidence provided to your 
attorney during discovery? 
20. Have you told your attorney about any witnesses who 
would show your innocence? 
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive 
any defenses, both factual and legal, that you believe 
you may have in this case? 
22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that 
you believe should still be filed in this case? 
YES 
NO 
If so, what motions or requests? _________________ _ 
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional 
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to challenge 
any rulings that came before the guilty plea including: 1) 
any searches or seizures that occurred in your case, 2) 
any issues concerning the method or manner of your 
arrest, and 3) any issues about any statements you may 
have made to law enforcement? 
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are 
admitting the truth of each and every allegation 
contained in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty? 
25. Are you currently on probation or parole? 
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this case 
could be the basis of a violation of that probation or 
parole? 
26. Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the United 
YES NO 
YES NO 
YES ® 
YES NO 
5 
States, the entry of a plea or making of factual 
admissions could have consequences of deportation or 
removal, inability to obtain legal status in the United 
States, or denial of an application for United States 
citizenship? 
27.Do you know whether the crime to which you will plead 
guilty would require you to register as a sex offender? 
(l.C. § 18-8304) 
28.Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be 
required to pay restitution to the victims in this case? 
(l.C. § i 9-5304) 
29. Have you agreed to pay restitution to any other party as 
a condition of your plea agreement? 
If so, to whom? _____________ _ 
30. ls there a mandatory driver's license suspension as a 
result of a guilty plea in this case? 
If so, for how long must your license be suspended? __ 
31.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which a mandatory 
domestic violence, substance abuse, or psychosexual 
evaluation is required? (l.C. §§ 18-918(7)(a),-8005(9),-
8317) 
32.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you may be 
required to pay the costs of prosecution and 
investigation? (l.C. § 37-2732A(K)) 
33.Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which you will be 
required to submit a DNA sample to the state? (l.C. § 
19-5506) 
34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the court 
could impose a fine for a crime of violence of up to 
$5,000, payable to the victim of the crime? (1.C. § 19-
5307) 
35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
~ NO 
~ 
(ffi) NO 
YES 8 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES e 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your ~ 
right to vote in Idaho? (lo. CONST. art. 6, § 3) (_/ NO 
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
6 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your 
right to hold public office in Idaho? CONST. art. 6, §3) 
Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, 
during the period of your sentence, you will lose your 
right to perform jury service in Idaho? (lo. CONST. art. 6, 
§ 3) 
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony 
you will lose your right to purchase, possess, or carry 
firearms? (1.C. § 18-310) 
39. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney, 
can force you to plead guilty in this case? 
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarily? 
41.Are you pleading guilty because you did commit the acts 
alleged in the information or indictment? 
42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help you fill 
out this form, have you had any trouble understanding 
your interprete1r? 
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the 
questions in this form which you could not resolve by 
discussing the issue with your attorney? 
@ 
@ NO 
(~ NO 
NO s 
YES 
€) 
YES NO 
YES 
have answered the questions on pages 1-7 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form 
truthfully, understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each 
question and answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and 
voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do so. 
Dated this ( -5 day of f!I f\orCl!\. , 2o_LJ., 
!ffa/&e-V~ 
DEFENDANT 
I hereby acknowledge that I have discussed, in detail, the foregoing questions and 
a swers~ ith my client. 
7 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
c_;lA tl tfJ tt u) 
Defendant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER FOR 
H..2onditional Release/Pretrial Services / 0 Release on Own Recognizance 
0 Commitment on Bond 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the defendant abide by the following conditions of release: 
_l// . 
LA!.'.Jdefendant 1s Ordered released 
/ 0 On own recognizance 0 Placed on probation 0 Case Dismissed 
D Bond having been set in the sum of$ _______ 0 Total Bond 
, DEPUTY 
D Bond having been 0 increased 0 reduced to the sum of$ _______ _ 0 Total Bond 
D Upon posting bond, defendant must report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services office as stated below: 
/1 
!£[,Defendant shall report to the Canyon County Pretrial Services Office and follow the standard reporting conditions: 
/ Comply with a curfew designated by the Court or standard curfew set by Pretrial Services . 
D Not consume or possess alcoholic beverages or mood altering substances without a valid prescription. 
D Submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol and/or drugs as requested by Pretrial Services at defendant's expense. 
D Not operate or be in the driver's position of any motor vehicle. 
D Abide by any No Contact Order and its conditions. 
D Submit to 0 GPS 0 Alcohol monitoring as directed by Pretrial Services. 
Defendants Ordered to submit to GPS or alcohol monitoring shall make arrangements with a provider 
approved by Pretrial Services, prior to release. 
~\ fi i t· r , ~ f '' . '"' ' l' . . OTHER: \ 1'..J j) Ir 1 ( lc.l LC ·""' ! , ·7 I I) t;l( 1. 3/is /13 
Failure by defendant to comply with the rulesanctler reporting conditions and/or ~equirements of release as 
Ordered by the Court may result in the revoc~~ion ;r~elease and return to the custody of the Sheriff. 
CJX/~¥//\ 
' / ~hite - Court 
Signed: . ·-- \ )/ , , I 1 
,- ~\j/V ! ' '!.··~-~·/ l,/ Judge 
~ow - Jail/Pretrial Services ,.~ - Defendant 
/ 
10/11 
JN DISTRICT COURT OF THE THlRD JUDICIAL 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN Al~D FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
CASE NO. 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER TO REPORT TO 
rUutWil/ 11 ) ~vDOllO Def~chfut. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DISTRICT PROBATION &PAROLE 
YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO report to the Department of CmTections District III 
Probation & Parole division to set an appointment for your pre-sentence interview and for the 
setting of interviews in connection with court ordered substance abuse or mental health evaluations. 
WITHIN 48 HOURS, excluding weekends, you must report, in person, to their office 
located at 3110 Cleveland Blvd.; Bldg. D; Caldwell, Idaho; Phone (208) 
IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO LEA VE A MESSAGE. YOU 
APPEAR AT THEIR OFFICE AND :MAKE AN APPOINTMENT 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATOR. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL A 
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. 
Dated this n day of 61tullt&J '20 I 3. ~"') 
'Pi!ltl 
I hereby ce1tify that I caused the foregoing to be hand delivered to the defendant and served 
upon the following via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, facsimile transmission or by placing in their out 
box located in the Canyon County Clerk's office: 
V/CANYON CO. PROSECUTING ATTORt'\1EY DISTRICT III PROBATION & PAROLE 
( 1115 Albany S aldwell, Idaho 83605 3110 Cleveland Blvd., Caldwell, Id 83605 
~NYON/, DEFENDER 510 Arthur Street, Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
.. .,,,..v.,.~ ame & Address 
( ~d1lJ?tul_u/clK / 
'--iSeputy Clerk Date 
~o: /':::urt 6~u~?o,e Cou°'ei 4 ORDE£oREP~~~? ___ , 
DISTRICT III PRDBATION & 12/13/2012 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
CONTINUED HEARING 
STATE OF IDAHO 
-vs-
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Plaintiff 
Case No. CR2012·12437-C 
CR2012-12215-C 
Date: May 6. 2013 I 2:15 p.m. 
Defendant. Judge: Thomas J. Rvan 
Reported By: Kim Saunders 
D True Name 
Corrected Name: 
APPEARANCES: 
D Defendant 
[gj Prosecutor - Matt Bever 
PROCEEDINGS: This matter shall be 
Reccrding: DCRT4 (233-234) 
Hearing: sentencing 
[gjDefendant's Attorney - Lary Sisson 
D Interpreter -
D Other-
[gj continued to the ih day of May, 2013 1 :30 p.m. before Judge Ryan. 
D per stipulation of counsel [gj at the request of D State [gj Defendant/Counsel 
[8J to allow defendant to appear, had transportation issues. 
BAIL: The Defendant was 
D released on own recognizance (O.R.). 
D remanded to custody of the sheriff. 
DBailset$ __ 
OTHER: __ 
D
D released to pre-trial release officer. 
released on bond previously posted. 
-~f1~· ----=b=___,,,~,-~~. ___ ,Deputy Clerk 
CONTINUED HEARING 08/2009 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: THOMAS J. RYAN DATE: MAY 7, 3 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COURT MINUTE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CR2012-12437-C 
CR2012-12215-C 
TIME: 1 :30 P.M. 
DCRT4 (131-144) 
REPORTED BY: Kim Saunders 
This having been the time heretofore set for sentencing in the above-entitled 
matter, the State was represented by Mr. Matt Bever, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for 
Canyon County, Idaho; and the defendant was present and represented by Mr. Lary 
Sisson. 
The Court called the case and determined all parties had received I reviewed the 
Presentence Investigation Report and the GAIN-I assessment. Factual corrections 
were made to the Presentence Investigation Report. 
Mr. Bever moved to dismiss the companion misdemeanor charge, recommended 
probation and presented argument. He requested an underlying sentence one (1) 
year fixed followed by three (3) indeterminate and submitted on the issue of a withheld 
judgment. Mr. Bever requested restitution in the amount of $100.00 for lab testing and 
submitted to the Court on any other terms and conditions of the sentence. 
COURT MINUTE 
MAY 6, 2013 
1 
Mr. Sisson made statements about the defendant and presented argument in 
support of the Court granting the defendant a withheld judgment. He recommended a 
three (3) year period of probation, one hundred (100) hours of community seNice 
pursuant to statute and Level I treatment. Mr. Sisson believed the defendant had credit 
for forty-two (42) days seNed and requested no additional jail to seNe, just 
discretionary jail granted to the probation officer. 
The defendant made no statements to the Court on his own behalf. 
The Court examined the defendant as to his residence and indicated it had no 
objection to an interstate compact with Oregon. 
The Court granted the withheld judgment and placed the defendant on 
probation for three (3) years under the standard terms and conditions of 
probation, which where explained to him, and the following additional conditions: 
The defendant was ordered to pay court costs, reimburse the County for the 
Public Defender in the amount of $350.00, and pay the monthly of supervision. 
The defendant was ordered to enroll in and successfully complete Level I 
treatment as recommended in the substance abuse evaluation. The defendant 
was not to purchase, possess, or consume any alcohol or enter into any business 
where alcohol was the primary source of revenue. The defendant was ordered to 
serve one hundred eighty (180) days in the county jail at the discretion of 
probation officer. The defendant was ordered to complete one hundred (100) 
hours of community service. 
COURT MINUTE 
MAY6,2013 
2 
In answer to Mr. Bever's inquiry and there being no the 
defense, the Court ordered the defendant to pay pursuant to the 
restitution order. 
The Court provided the defendant a notice of his rights upon sentencing, which 
the defendant reviewed, signed, and returned to the Court. 
Both of counsel returned their copy of the Presentence Investigation Report to 
the Court. 
The defendant was released to probation. 
COURT MINUTE 
MAY 6, 2013 
arr 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437 
Plaintiff, 
RESTITUTION ORDER 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, 
Defendant. 
Based upon the judgment and sentence in this case, and the expenses of the victim on this 
matter, and pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 37-2732. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT THE DEFENDANT, MATTHEW 0 BROOKS, pay 
ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($100.00) in restitution that such 
restitution be paid to the Court to be distributed by the Court to the following victim(s): 
Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services 
700 S. Stratford Dr., Suite #125 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
Date Lab Expense 
7/20/2012 $100.00 
RESTITUTION ORDER 
Total 
$100.00 
Such restitution shall be joint and several with any other co-defendants who are ordered 
to restitution arising from the same occurrence or event. 
There are no known co-defendants. 
In cases where there are direct and indirect victims, restitution payments will be 
distributed to direct victims before indirect victims. 
It is FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to LC. Section 19-5305, that forty-two ( 42) 
days after entry of this order, or at the conclusion of a hearing to reconsider this order, whichever 
occurs later, this order may be recorded as judgment and the victim( s) may execute as provided 
by law for civil judgments. 
DATED this 1.(A-. day of ___ _._ ______ , 2013. 
District Judge 
1 
RESTITUTION ORDER 2 
OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
forwarded to the following persons this 6, 
Prosecutor: 
Public Defender: 
Idaho State Police: 
Forensic Services 
700 S. Stratford Dr., Suite #125 
Meridian, ID 83642-6202 
Felony Parole & Probation: 
RESTITUTION ORDER 
Mailed 
Mailed 
Mailed 
----
Court Basket ~ 
~ 
Court Basket 
---
Court Basket 
---- ----
Court Basket 
----
Dated s/ ~ in_ 
By: 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
Clerk of the District Court 
07/09/2012 Idaho State Police Forensic Services 
700 South Stratford Ste 125 Meridian ID 83642-6202 
CL Case No.: 
Agency: 
ORI: 
M20122082 
SP30 - ISP-PATROL 
IDISP0300 
Case No.: 812001578 
Crime Date: May 12, 2012 
Criminalistic Analysis Report - CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ANALYSIS 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF IDAHO} 
} SS. 
COUNTY OF ADA } 
Corinna C. Owsley, being first duly sworn, deposes and says the following: 
2 
1. That I am a Forensic Scientist II with Forensic Services and am 
qualified to perform the examination and draw conclusions of the type shown 
on the attached reporL; 
2. That Forensic Services is part of the Idaho State Police; 
I 
3. That I conducted a scientific examination of evidence described in Lhe 
attached report in the ordinary course and scope of my duties with Forensic 
Services; 
4. That the conclusion(s) expressed in that report is/are correct LO the 
best of my knowledge; 
5. That the case identifying information reflected in that report came 
from the evidence packaging, a case report, or another reliable source. 
6. That a true and accurate copy of that report is attached to this 
Date: I I 
SUBSCRIBED 
,.. .•.• 1 
Not;.e.ry Public 
co!Tu~ission Expires: 
/ 
-"~~~,_,__.:....~~~~~~ 
Idaho State Police 
Drug Restitution 
As provided in Idaho Code 37-2732(k), the Idaho State Police requests restitution from 
the defendant(s), Matthew 0 Brooks in the amount of $100.00 in association with 
Laboratory Report No. M20122082. This amount is based upon the confirmation of the 
following drug(s) being present in the sample(s) submitted to this laboratory. The 
amount requested reflects a portion of the cost incurred to the laboratory during the 
analysis of drug evidence. 
Confirmed Drug/ Analysis Cost 
1) Methamphetamine (1 sample confirmed at 100.00 each) 100.00 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
Please present this restitution request form and a copy of the laboratory report to the 
court at the time of sentencing. 
Please make checks payable to: Forensic Services 
700 South Stratford Drive Ste 125 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Natasha Wheatley 
Forensic Services 
Laboratory Manager 
mh 
July 9, 2012 
0 0 1 59 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
SS#
D.O
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER OF PROBATION ON 
WITHHELD J 
CASE NO. CR2012-12437-C 
On this ]1h day of May, 2013, personally appeared Matt Bever, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County, Idaho and the defendant, Matthe\v 0. Brooks, 
and the defendant's attorney, Lary Sisson. 
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that the ends of justice and the best 
interests of the public, as well as of the defendant, will be served thereby, it is Ordered 
that the Judgment be withheld on the defendant's plea of guilty to the offense of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a felony, as charged in the Information, a 
violation of Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(1), committed on or about the 1ih day of 
May, 2012, in compliance with Idaho Code 19-2601, sub section 3, and that the 
defendant be placed on probation under the supervision and control of the Idaho State 
Department of Correction, Probation and Parole Division and this Court for a period of 
three (3) years commencing on the ]1h day of May, 2013, under the following terms and 
conditions: 
That the defendant shall: (a) violate no State, Federal, or Municipal penal laws; 
(b) not change residence without first obtaining written permission from the supervising 
officer; (c) submit a truthful written report to the supervising officer each and every 
month and report in person when requested; (d) not leave the State or the Judicial 
District assigned to supervise the defendant's probation without first obtaining written 
permission from the supervising officer; (e) seek and maintain employment or a 
ORDER OF PROBATION ON 
WITHHELD JUDGMENT 
/'},-,Al;. 
program approved by the supervising officer, and not change employment or program 
without first obtaining written permission from the supervising officer; (f) waive 
defendant's constitutional right to be free from search and consent to the search of their 
person, residence, vehicle, or property at the request of the supervising officer or any 
law enforcement officer; (g) not purchase or possess any firearms or weapons; (h) not 
possess any controlled substances without a valid prescription; (i) submit to tests for 
controlled substances and/or alcohol at probationer's own expense upon the request of 
the supervising officer or any law enforcement officer; (j) follow the advice and 
instructions of the supervising officer; (k) execute a waiver of extradition. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: 
1. The defendant shall pay in the oirder listed each of the foilowing sums as 
specified: 
A. Court costs of $17.50: 
B. Victims compensation fund of $75.00; 
C. Pay restitution pursuant to the restitution order; 
D. An !STARS technology fee of $10.00; 
E. A fee of $10.00 for deposit into the peace officers standards and training 
account; 
F. A fee in the amount of $350.00 to reimburse the County tor the cost of the 
Public Defender; 
G. An administrative surcharge of $10.00 for deposit into the county justice fund; 
H. A fee in the amount of $10.00 for the Drug Violations Hotline; 
I. A fee in the amount of $30.00 for the Substance Abuse/Domestic Violence 
fund; 
J. A fee in the amount of $3.00 for the Peace and Detention Officer's Temporary 
Disability fund; 
ORDER OF PROBATION ON 
WITHHELD JUDGMENT 
2 
K. An emergency surcharge in the amount of $100.00. 
All of the previous stated amounts of money are due and payable to the District 
Court at a rate and schedule to be determined by the supervising officer. 
1. Pay a monthly probation supervision fee as set by the supervising officer; 
OTHER SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
1. The defendant shall enroll in and successfully complete all programs of 
rehabilitation recommended by his supervising officer including, but not limited to 
programs on substance abuse, anger management, vocational rehabilitation, 
mental health, and self-esteem counseling; 
2. The defendant shall enroll in and successfully complete all treatment as 
recommended in the substance abuse evaluation ordered pursuant to l.C. § 19-
2524; 
3. The defendant shall not purchase, possess or consume alcohol, nor enter into 
any establishment where the sale of alcohol is the primary source of revenue; 
4. The defendant shall complete one hundred (100) hours of community service on 
a schedule to be determined by his supervising officer. 
5. The defendant shall serve one hundred eighty (180) days in the Canyon County 
Jail at the discretion of his supervising officer and with the approval of the Court; 
The Court had no objection to the defendant's probation being transferred via 
interstate compact to Oregon upon the approval of the defendant's supervising officer. 
The terms of the defendant's probation may be revoked, modified, or extended at 
any time by the Court, and in the event of any violation of the conditions hereof, during 
the period of probation, the Court may revoke this Order and impose Judgment. 
ORDER OF PROBATION ON 
WITHHELD JUDGMEl\JT 
Defendant is subject to arrest without a warrant for violation of any condition hereby 
imposed. 
DATED this tifL.day of May, 2013. 
understand, accept and will abide by the terms and conditions of the above 
Order. 
DATED this __ day of---------' 2013. 
WITNESSED: 
ORDER OF PROBATION ON 
WITHHELD JUDGMENT 
4 
Defendant 
MARK J. MIMURA 
CANYON COUNTY 
LARY G. SISSON 
5 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEFENDER 
IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR-2012-12437-C 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
NOTICE OF 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, appeals against 
the above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the following: 
A. The Judgment of Conviction and Commitment that was filed in this 
matter on or about May 14, 2013. 
2. These matters were heard, and the Judgments were entered, in the Third 
Judicial District, in and for the County of Canyon by District Court Judge Thomas J. Ryan. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on 
intends to assert the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal not 
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal or amending listed 
below. 
A. Whether the Court erred on or about September 2012 by 
to grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence? 
4. Appellant has the right to appeal all final judgments of convictions m 
criminal proceedings pursuant to Rule l l(c)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
5. Appellant requests a transcript, in electronic form only, of the following 
hearings in this matter: 
A. The Motion to Suppress Hearing held on August 16, 2012. 
6. In addition to the standard clerk's record on appeal, the Appellant requests 
the following: 
A. Copies of all briefs, memorandums, objections, and responses to 
objections filed in this matter which were related to the Motion to Suppress; and 
B. Copies of all exhibits admitted into evidence during the Motion to 
Suppress Hearing that was held on August 16, 2012. 
7. I certify: 
A. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each 
Reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Kim Saunders 
c/o Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
B. That the appellant is exempt from the estimated 
because he is indigent. 
C. That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the clerk's record because he is indigent. 
D. That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee 
because he is indigent. 
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 and the attorney general ofidaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1 ), 
Idaho Code. 
DATED tl:-iis 24th day of May, 2013. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
LARY G. SISSON 
Assistant Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 24th day of May, 2013, I served a true and correct 
within and foregoing Notice of Appeal upon the individual(s) named 
noted: 
../' By placing copies of the same in the designated courthouse box of the 
below. 
Bryan F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Kim Saunders 
Court Reporter 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
the manner 
indicated 
../' By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class, to 
the addresses of the person(s) indicated below. 
Lawrence Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3040 N. Lake Harbor, Ste 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Matthew 0. Brooks 
1061 NW B~·iar Creek Way, 227 
Beaverton, OR 97006 
LARY G. SISSON 
Assistant Public Defender 
4 
i 
MARK ,J. lVIIMURA 
CANYON COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
G. SISSON 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
CASE NO. CR-2012-12437-C 
MOTION FOR 
STATE 
DEFENDER 
OF 
COMES NOW, MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, by and through the his attorneys of record, 
the Canyon County Public Defender's Office, and hereby moves this Comt for order, pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 19-867 et. seq., appointing the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to 
represent the Appellant in all further appellate proceedings and allowing current counsel for the 
defendant to withdraw as counsel of record for the purpose of appellate proceedings. This 
motion is brought on the grounds and for the reasons that: 
1. The Appellant is currently represented by the Canyon County Public Defender; 
2. The State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to represent the 
defendant in all felony appellate proceedings; 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE Page 1 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3. It is the interest of justice for them to do so this case since 
indigent and any further proceedings on this case will an 
DATED this 24th day of May, 2013. 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
LARY G. SISSON 
Assistant Public Defender 
Page 2 
defendant is 
I hereby on 24th day of May, 2013, I a true correct the 
above and foregoing Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender upon the 
individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
../ By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attorney(s) indicated below. 
Bryan F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Kim Saunders 
Court Reporter 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
../ By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class, or 
Lawrence Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3040 N. Lake Harbor, Ste 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
Matthew 0. Brooks 
1061 NW Briar Creek \Vay, 227 
Beaverton, OR 97006 
LARY G. SISSON 
Assistant Public Defender 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ST ATE Page 3 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
L•~L~~~.L~ J. MIMURA 
COUNTY 
LARY G. SISSON 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 639-4610 
Facsimile: (208) 639-4611 
Idaho State Bar No. 6072 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
OF IDAHO, 
CASE NO. CR-201 12437-C 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLt\TE PUBLIC 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to Defendant/ Appellant's 
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender; the Court having reviewed the 
pleadings on file and the motion, the Court being fully apprised in the matter and good cause 
appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Public Defender is withdrawn as 
counsel of record for the Defendant-Appellant and the State Appellate Public Defender is hereby 
appointed to represent the Defendant-Appellant, MATTHE\V 0. BROOKS, in the above entitled 
matters for appellate purposes. 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
The appointment of the State Appellate Public Defender is for purposes of the appeal 
~ ~ DATED this-2Q:_ day May, 2013. 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
THOMAS J. RY Al'l" 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICAT~ERVICE 
7\ Ct3yv 
I hereby certify that on the ~J of.J>f!Y.' 2013, I served a true 
foregoing upon the individual(s) named beiow in the manner noted: 
By delivering copies of the same to the designated courthouse boxes of the 
indicated below. 
correct 
Bryan F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street 
Canyon County Public Defender 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Kim Saunders 
Court Reporter 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Matthew 0. Brooks 
c/o Canyon County Public 
510 Arthur Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
the 
or 
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class, to the 
following indicated below. 
Lawrence Was den 
Idaho Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
ORDER APPOINTING ST ATE 
APPELL'\ TE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3040 N. Lake Harbor, Ste 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
Clerk of the Court 
~~ By:~ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
-vs-
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-12-12437*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify the following are 
being sent as exhibits: 
Presentence Investigation Report 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this __.._.~- day 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ~ND FOR THE COUNTY OF CM"YON 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-12-12437 *C 
Plaintiff- ) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
-vs- ) CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
) 
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, ) 
) 
Defendant- ) 
Appellant. ) 
I, CHRIS Y~l\1AMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled case was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including all documents lodged or filed as requested 
in the Notice of Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ~~- day 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMA.M:OTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
OF IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court 41046-2013 
-vs-
MATTHEW 0. BROOKS, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SER\lICE 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one 
of the Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcripts to the 
record to each party as follows: 
Sara Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Ste. 100, Boise, Idaho 83703 
Lmvrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this----=--- day 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the J udicia1 
District of the State of Idaho 
in and for the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
of 
